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Chapter 1
Codes of Conduct, Private
Information and Repeated Games
1.1 Introduction
The theory of repeated games has made enormous strides in penetrating the difficult but
relevant setting in which players observe noisy signals of each other’s play.1 Unfortunately
as our knowledge of equilibria in these games has expanded there is an increasing sense that
the types of equilibria studied - involving as they do elaborately calibrated indifference - are
difficult for players to play and unlikely to be observed in practice.
By way of contrast, if we give up on the notion of exact optimization, the theory of ap-
proximate equilibria in repeated games is simpler and generally more satisfactory than the
theory of exact equilibrium. However, it is difficult to rationalize, for example, why a player
who is aware that he has been lucky and his opponent has very favorable signals about his
behavior, does not take advantage of this knowledge to behave badly. In fact, it is exactly
1See for example, [Sugaya(2011)] and references therein.
1
this type of small gain that approximate equilibrium constructions are based on. In addition,
the abstract world of repeated games is not very like the world we inhabit. It is a world in
which poker is a dull game because players can never guess that their opponent is bluffing
from the expression on his face. It would also be surprising to have skilled interrogators who
by asking a few pointed questions can tell whether a suspect is lying or telling the truth.
A class of games in which players have at least a chance of fathoming each others in-
tentions whether through facial expressions or skilled interrogation - was introduced in
[Levine and Pesendorfer(2007)]. The basic setup here is the [Levine and Pesendorfer(2007)]
model generalized to allow for asymmetries. It utilizes the notion that players employ codes
of conduct - complete specifications of how they and their opponents “should” play. Players
also receive signals about what code of conduct their opponent may be using, while their
own code of conduct enables them to respond to these signals. This is the “self-referential”
nature of the games studied here. One key question addressed in this paper is how and when
such self-referential codes of conduct make sense.
This paper views direct observation of opponents intentions and repetition of a game as com-
plements rather than substitutes. Even if direct observation is unreliable, it may be enough
to overcome the small ε’s that arise when simple repeated game strategies are employed.
An effective code of conduct rewards players for using the same code of conduct, and punishes
them for using a different code of conduct. Several examples explore such issues as when
players in a repeated setting might get information about the past play of new partners from
other players. Results of [Levine and Pesendorfer(2007)] about perfect discrimination are
generalized to the asymmetric setting. General results about when approximate equilibria
in a base game can be sustained as strict equilibria in the corresponding self-referential
game are given. As an application a discounted strict Nash folk-like theorem for enforceable
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mutually punishable payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring is proven despite
very limited ability to observe directly.
The notion of self-referential strategies has a long history of discovery and rediscovery. The
earliest notion we are aware of appears in [Howard(1988)] who discusses computer programs
that play based on reading each other. This idea was formalized in [Tennenholtz(2004)]
that developed the concept of program equilibrium. In the context of two-player games
[Kalai et al.(2010)Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet] developed conditional devices that play
on behalf of players and condition on their opponent’s conditional device. Using these
conditional devices as a source of commitment they proved a folk like theorem for one-shot
games. [Levine and Pesendorfer(2007)] were primarily interested in self-referential games as
a simple alternative to repeated games that exhibit many of the same features. For example
they showed that in a two player symmetric setting if players can accurately determine
whether or not their opponent is using the same strategy as they are then a type of folk
theorem holds. The simple structure of static self-referential games made it possible to
answer questions about which of many equilibria have long-run stability properties in an
evolutionary setting. These questions were impractical to study in repeated games.
1.2 The Model
Consider a finite base game Γ = {I, {Si, ui}i∈I} with set of players I. Player i has finitely
many strategies Si. Note that we allow mixed strategies, there are only a finite number of
them: for example, only a six-sided dice is available. Notice also that we assume implicitly
either a finite horizon, or a very small subset of strategies in an infinite horizon – for example,
finite automata with an upper bound on the number of states. We denote by S = ×iSi
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the corresponding profile of strategies. Utility of player i is given by the payoff function
ui : S → R with the usual notation uj(sj, s−j) for the strategy profile of all players but
player j.
The self-referential game is defined upon any base game Γ. The set of players is I as in the
base game. Each player i has a finite set of private signals Yi with element yi and profile
y ∈ Y = ×iYi. We assume that the cardinality of the set of signals is |Yi| ≥ 2 for each player
i. The strategy of player i in the self-referential game is an |I| × 1-vector whose element
corresponding to jth is a mapping from player j’s set of private signals to player i’s set of
strategies in the base game, i.e. rij : Yj → Sj. We call this strategy code of conduct and
we denote it by ri where ri = (r1i , . . . , r
i
N). The common abstract space of codes of conduct
is defined as the set of all maps from player’s private signals set into player’s strategy set,
R0 := {ri | rij : Zj → Sj for all i, j}. We write r ∈ R for the profile of codes of conduct.
For each profile r ∈ R, let pi(·|r) be the probability distribution over profiles Y . The collection
of probability distributions over profile of private signals is denoted by {pi(·|r)|r ∈ R}. Let
pii(·|r) be the marginal probability distribution of pi(·|r) over profile Y . That is, pii(yi|r) is
the probability that player i observes yi if players have chosen profile of codes of conduct r.
Notice that codes of conduct play two roles. First, they determine how players play as a
function of the signals they receive: that is, a player who has chosen the code of conduct ri
and who observes the signal yi plays r
i
i(yi). Second, codes of conduct influence the signals
yj players j receive about each others’ intentions through the probability distribution pi.
In the self-referential game all players i simultaneously choose codes of conduct ri ∈ R0. If
the profile of codes of conduct is r ∈ R the corresponding expected utility of player i is given
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by
Ui(r) =
∑
y∈Y
ui(r
1
1(y1), . . . , r
N
N (yN))pi(y|r).
A Nash equilibrium of the self-referential game is a profile of codes of conduct r such that
for all players i and any alternative code of conduct r˜i, it follows that Ui(r) ≥ Ui(r˜i, r−i).
Once we have defined formally the self-referential game, let us sketch its timing. Before
playing the base game and observing any signals, players simultaneously choose codes of
conduct ri. Afterwards, each player i privately observes his signal yi generated by the
probability distribution pi(y|r) for y ∈ Y . Finally, players execute their codes of conduct
and play the base game rii(yi) = si for si ∈ Si. When choosing a code of conduct ri, players
commit to adhere to it.
1.3 Examples
Let the self-referential game consist of a binary space of signals Yi = {0, 1} for each player
i, where 0 may be interpreted as we are both using the same code of conduct and 1 may
be interpreted as we are both using different codes of conduct. This interpretation would
be consistent with the probability distribution of signals profile where private signals are
conditionally independent pi(y|r) = pii(yi|r)pij(yj|r) and for all players i, j with q ≥ p let
In words, if the two players employ different codes of conduct they are more likely to receive
the signal 1. Finally, the space of codes of conduct R0 we will take to be all pairs of maps
(r1, r2) where ri : {0, 1} → S1 × S2. We maintain this self-referential game throughout the
next two examples.
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1.3.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
We will study a prisoner’s dilemma game. The actions are denoted C for cooperate and D
for defect, and the payoffs are given in the table below. We focus on pure strategies in this
base game Si = {C,D} for all players i.
C D
C 5,5 0,6
D 6,0 1,1
One equilibrium profile of codes of conduct r ∈ R is simply to ignore the signal and defect,
that is, all players i = 1, 2 choose strategy ri ∈ R0 such that rii(yi) = D for any signal yi,
and pick any map for their opponent rij(yj) = sj for all yj, sj. This is a Nash equilibrium
of the self-referential game exactly as in the strict Nash equilibrium of the base game, and
each player gets 1.
Let us investigate the possibility of sustaining cooperation through self-referentiality. In
particular, we consider the code of conduct rˆi that chooses C if the signal 0 is received, and
chooses D if the signal 1 is received. Each player i adheres to the code of conduct rˆi where
for all players i, j it prescribes
rˆij(yj) :=

C for yj = 0,
D otherwise.
If both players adhere to the code of conduct rˆi, they receive an expected utility of Ui(rˆ) =
5 − 4p. A player who chooses instead to always defect, thus r˜ii(yi) = D for all yi and
r˜ij(yj) = sj for any sj, yj, gets Ui(r˜
i, rˆj) = 6 − 5q, and does worse by always cooperating.
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The code of conduct profile rˆ is a strict Nash equilibrium of the self-referential game when
q ≥ 4/5 + 1/5p. This says, in effect, that the signal must be informative enough.
1.3.2 The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
We now consider the prisoner’s dilemma repeated twice and we use the sum of payoffs
between the two periods. Consider the following code of conduct ri.
rij(yj) :=

CC if yj = 0,
DD if yj = 1.
Since play is not conditioned on what the other player does in the first period, the optimal
alternative code of conduct r˜i against this code ri is given by r˜ii(yi) = DD for any yi and
any kind of mapping r˜ij(yj) = sj for any sj ∈ {C,D}2 and yj. Thereafter, the analysis is the
same as in the one-period case.
Next, we wish to examine whether it might nevertheless be possible to have cooperation in
the two period game when the marginal probability distribution satisfies q < 1/5 + 4/5p.
For simplicity of the exposition we analyze the case in which p = 0. We consider the code
of conduct rˆi that prescribes for all players i, j
rij(yj) :=

tit-for-tat if yj = 0,
DD if yj = 1.
In other words, following the good signal 0 players play tit-for-tat, following the bad signal
1 players defect in both periods. If both players adhere to the code of conduct rˆi, they get
expected payoffs equal to Ui(rˆ) = 10.
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There are two alternative codes of conduct of interest r˜i, rˇi: to defect in both periods, or to
cooperate in the first period then defect in the second period.
Consider first the code of conduct r˜i that says r˜ii(yi) = DD for any yi, and any map r˜
i
j(yj) =
sj for all yj, sj. A player who chooses r˜
i has a 1 − q chance of getting 6, and a q chance of
getting 1 in the first period, while he gets 1 in the second period for sure. Thus, the expected
utility is Ui(r˜
i, rˆj) = 7−5q. Since this is less than 10 for any q, it is never optimal the choice
of this alternative code of conduct r˜i. Next, suppose the code of conduct rˇi characterized
by rˇii(yi) = CD for any yi, and r˘
i
j(yj) = sj for any yj and sj. Player i gets expected payoff
of Ui(rˇ
i, rˆj) = 11 − 10q. From these results we can work out that our code of conduct rˆi
would be chosen over rˇi when the probability distribution satisfies q > 1/10. If this condition
holds, the profile of codes of conduct rˆ is a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential game. By
comparison in the one-period game we require q > 1/5 so for 1/10 ≤ q < 1/5 we can sustain
cooperation in the two period game, but not in the one-period game. By violating the code
of conduct with the intention to deviate in the final period the deviator risks being found
out and punished when cooperating in the first period. Notice also that the code of conduct
rˆi is a strict self-referential Nash equilibrium except in the boundary case when q = 1/10.
It is interesting also to see what happens in the T <∞ period repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game with no discounting. Let us consider the time-average payoff. Consider the code of
conduct rˆi that says that both players should play the grim-strategy on the good signal, and
always defect on the bad signal. We write DT for the T × 1-vector of all D entries
rij(yj) :=

tit-for-tat if yj = 0,
DT if yj = 1.
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This gives a payoff of Ui(rˆ) = 5. The optimal alternative code of conduct r˜
i against this
code of conduct is to play the grim-strategy until the final period, then defect. Formally,
r˜ii(yi) = (CT−1, D) for all yi with CT−1 representing a T − 1× 1-vector of all C entries, and
for the opponent it says r˜ij(yj) = sj for all yj and sj ∈ {C,D}T . The expected payoff would
be Ui(r˜
i, rˆj) = 1/T [(1− q)(5T + 1) + q(T − 1)]. Hence it is optimal to adhere to the code
of conduct rˆi when q ≥ 1/(4T + 2). The salient fact is that as T → ∞ only a very tiny
probability of “getting caught” is needed to sustain cooperation.
1.4 Are Self-Referential Games Relevant?
There are three issues to address. First: to what extent is it possible for strategies to recog-
nize one another and make use of that information? Second: what is the proper extension of
self-referential strategies from two player symmetric games to general games? Third: does
this model capture some aspect of reality? Since there is scarcely reason to discuss whether
the model captures an aspect of reality if it is impossible to implement self-referential strate-
gies, we address each of these issues in turn.
1.4.1 Codes of Conduct as Computer Algorithms
A simple physical model of strategies is to imagine that players play by submitting computer
programs to play on their behalf. In this setting, computer programs work as follows. Fix a
signal profile space Y and break the program into two parts, one of which generates Y based
on analyzing the programs, the other of which maps the signal profiles Y into the strategy
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profile space S. The programs are self-referential in the sense that they also receive as input
the program of the other player.
A fairly well-known result is the impossibility of running an algorithm in which we are able
to read the opponents program and best respond to it. On the other hand, it is still possible
to write down a computer program that gives one response if both programs are the same,
and gives an alternative response if different. One sequence of commands may execute a
particular strategy. This raises the question whether we are able to compare two programs
having the same function while written differently. The answer is no. The last comparison
must be based on actual code, and it cannot be made on function of program. For a more
detailed discussion, see [Levine and Szentes(2006)].
Specifically, we assume that there is a finite language L of computer statements, and a finite
limit l on the length of a program. The (finite) space of computer programs P consists of
all sequences in L of length less than or equal to l. Each program pi ∈ P produces outputs
which have the form of a map pi : P × P → {1, 2, . . . ,∞} × S. The interpretation is that
pi(p1, p2) = (νi, si) produces the result si after νi steps. In case νi = ∞, the program does
not halt. Notice that depending on the language L these programs can be either Turing
machines or finite state machines. A “self-referential strategy” consists of a pair consisting
of a “default strategy profile” and a program ri = (s¯i, pi), where s¯i ∈ S. After players
submit their program p1, p2, each program pi is given itself and the program submitted by
the opposing player p−i as inputs. All programs are halted after an upper limit of ν¯ steps.
If pi(pi, p−i) = (νi, si) and νi ≤ ν¯, that is, the program halted in time, we then define the
mapping ri(p1, p2) = si, otherwise ri(p1, p2) = s¯i. To map this to a self-referential game,
we take the signal space to be Y = S. Then the probability distribution of signal profiles
10
is pi(y|r) = 1 if yi = ri(pi, p−i) for all players i = 1, 2, and pi(y|r) = 0 otherwise. In this
context, self-referential signals are defined as
Definition 1.4.1. The strategy space S is self-referential with respect to the deadline ν¯ if
for every pair of actions a¯, a there exists a strategy s = (d, p) such that
p(d˜, p˜) :=

ν¯, a¯ if d˜ = d, p˜ = p,
ν, a otherwise.
Perhaps the easiest way to provide convincing proof that there are self-referential strategy
spaces is to provide a simple example of a strategy that satisfies the properties of definition
4.1. We consider the trading game with common action space A = {0, 1}. The default action
is s¯i = 0. The computer language is the Windows command language; the listing is given
below:
@echo off
if "0" EQU "\%3" goto sameactions
echo 0
goto finish
:sameactions
echo n | comp \%2 \%4
if \%errorlevel\% EQU 0 goto cooperate
echo 0
goto finish
:cooperate
echo 1
11
:finish
This program runs from the Windows command line, and takes as inputs four arguments:
a digit describing the “own” default action, a “own” filename, an opponent default action
and an opponent filename. If the opponent default action is 0, and the opponent program
is identical to the listing above, the program generates as its final output the number 1;
otherwise it generates the number 0. The point is, since it has access to sequence of its own
instructions, it simply compares them to the sequence of opponents program instructions to
see if they are the same or not. [Howard(1988)] uses this idea to analyze the case in which
two computer programs play a prisoners dilemma game. [Tennenholtz(2004)] developed
the concept of program equilibrium which works similarly to the Nash equilibrium of the
self-referential game within this context.
When one of the players knows that the other player has a relatively bounded memory size
and is not a skilled programmer, he might exploit this. Writing a program that seems to
be the same but actually is different requires large memory and clever computational skills.
In addition, the use of these computer programs may work just as well as secret handshake:
they will be visible to each other, but not to less sophisticated programs. For example, if
a portion of a program is not visible to a na¨ıve opponent, a clever programmer could fill it
with a particular meaningless sequence of code that is never executed but that serves only
to identify the program to a sophisticated opponent.
People playing games do not often do so by submitting computer programs. From an evo-
lutionary perspective, genes serve to an important extent as computer programs governing
how we behave. Modern anthropological research, such as [Tooby and Cosmides(1996)], em-
phasizes the extent to which social organization is influenced by the ability and inability
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to detect genetic differences using cues ranging from appearance to smell. These studies
suggest emotional programs create involuntary emitted signals that may be forecast of the
mind state.
1.4.2 From Two Players to Many
In a two player symmetric game, a player can compare himself to his opponent and tell
whether they both follow the same strategy or not. When we extend the environment and
allow more players in different roles such a simple comparison is no longer possible. Our
notion of a code of conduct is intended to capture what it means to “be the same” in a more
general setting.
In a multiplayer multi-role game a code of conduct may be interpreted as the specification
of how all players are supposed to play. This definition is convenient with asymmetry:
players can compare themselves to their opponents by determining if they have the same
expectations for how players in different roles (including their own) should play. Applying
this interpretation we can characterize two players agreeing about how all players should
behave as “adhering” to the same code of conduct. Players do not only agree about how
they would behave, but also about how third parties would behave. With two player games,
one would expect to observe situations in which players are able to recognize opponents’ kind
same or different. Signals that allow you to understand your opponents intentions might be
as simple as information systems or might be as the form of micro facial expressions. In
the context of player games, agents are endowed with the possibility of discovering everyone
elses intentions. This is motivated by the fact that humans are able to interpret signals from
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other people. We assume that players recognize intentions irrespectively of the number of
players in the game.
1.4.3 Do People Use Self-Referential Strategies?
Here is one possible motivation for this recognition technology. Strategies govern the behavior
of agents over many matches possibly randomly pairwise matches. Players are committed
to a particular strategy because it is too costly to change behavior in any particular match.
Suppose a player could observe the past interactions of an upcoming opponent. It might be
difficult on this basis to form an exact prediction of how that opponent would behave during
their own upcoming match. However, it would be considerably easier to determine if that
opponent conformed to a particular rule for example a player might be able to tell with a
reasonable degree of reliability whether that opponent was following the same or a different
strategy than he was employing himself. Moreover, portions of strategies might be directly
observable. For instance, an individual who rarely lies may blush whenever he is dishonest.
Seeing an opponent blush would indicate that he would be unlikely to be dishonest in future
interactions. (This example is due to [Frank(1987)].)
1.5 Perfect Information
Throughout this section we assume that signals in the self-referential game are perfectly
revealing, i.e. player directly observes the code of conduct chosen by his opponents.
Consider any base game Γ = {I, {Si, ui}i∈I}, which is not necessarily a repeated game. The
self-referential game consists of a finite set of signal spaces Yi for each i, a code of conduct
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space R0, and probability distribution over profile of signals given by pi(·|r). To analyze this
case we assume that each player i ∈ I is able to detect all opponents that do not adhere to
the same code of conduct. We say that the self-referential game permits detection if for each
player i and all players j ∈ I \ {i} there exists a set of private signals Y¯ ij ⊂ Yj such that
for any profile of codes of conduct r ∈ R, and any r˜i 6= ri we have pij(Y¯ ij |r˜i, r−i) = 1 and
pij(Y¯
i
j ) = 0. Intuitively, this says that if player i deviates every other player j detects this
deviation with certainty.
We define the (possibly mixed) minmax strategy of the base game against player i by si−i
as the argument of mins−i∈S−i maxsi∈Si ui(si, s−i). Let si = ui(s
i
i, s
i
−i) be the smallest payoff
that his opponent can keep player i below and sii denote i’s best response to s
i
−i.
Our first result in the perfect information case is similar to [Levine and Pesendorfer(2007)]
with the difference that we consider asymmetry and more than two players:
Theorem 1.5.1. If vi = ui(s) ≥ ui for all players i with strategy profile s ∈ S, then there
exists a profile of codes of conduct r ∈ R such that (v1, . . . , vN) is a Nash equilibrium payoff
of the self-referential version of the game.
Proof. Take any profile s ∈ S such that for any player i ∈ I, ui(s) ≥ ui. Consider the code
of conduct rˆi ∈ R0 that prescribes
rˆij(yj) :=

sj if yj ∈ Yj \ Y¯ ij ,
sij if yj ∈ Y¯ ij .
If all players choose this code of conduct, any player i would get Ui(rˆ) = ui(s). Contrary,
if player i adheres to some r˜i so that r˜ii(yi) = s˜i for all yi ∈ Yi and any s˜j; and r˜ij(yj) = sj
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for all yj, sj, he gets Ui(r˜
i, rˆ−i) = ui. It follows then that rˆ is a Nash equilibrium of the
self-referential game.
We turn now to the case with more than two players but we allow the possibility that only
some people receive these perfectly revealing signals. We define the notion of this group
by saying that a self-referential game is locally perfectly informative if there exists a proper
nonempty subset of players l ⊂ I such that all player k’s contained in that set its self-
referential structure satisfies permit detection. Formally, the self-referential game is said to
be locally perfectly informative if there is a subset of players l ∈ I and for all players k ∈ l
there exists a set of private signals Y¯ ij ⊂ Yj such that for any profile of codes of conduct
r ∈ R, for each player i, and any r˜i 6= ri we have pij(Y¯ ij |r˜i, r−i) = 1 and pij(Y¯ ij |r) = 0. All
players i ∈ I \ l observe a trivial signal yi = ∅.
In this specification, there is a possible scenario in which one of the players who receive the
perfectly revealing signal needs some other player to punish the deviator. To provide some
sort of communication we assume cheap talk after receiving private signals Yi and before
playing the base game Γ.
The game has the following timing. First, players select their code of conduct ri. Second,
after signals are received yi ∈ Yi, players make announcements on violation of the code of
conduct. Finally, agents play the base game. Whether this cheap talk communication turns
out to be useful or not is one of the goals of this exercise.
Each player adheres to a code of conduct, ri ∈ R0. After receiving private signals yi ∈ Yi
according to pii(·|r), players send cheap talk signals defined as announcements taken from
a finite set y˜i ∈ Y˜0, and a profile of announcements is defined as y˜ ∈ Y˜ := ×iY˜0. We allow
for the possibility of not sending a message, i.e. {∅} ∈ Y˜0. The space of announcements is
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common for all players. A message from player i is a map mi : Yi → Y˜0 with message profile
denoted by m = (m1, . . . ,mN). Once announcements have been made, players are engaged
to play Γ. A strategy for player i is the decision about a strategy si ∈ Si to take and a
message mi to send, that is, s
′
i = (mi, si) with s
′
i ∈ Y˜0 × Si.
Potentially, players may respond to such announcements. If player j announces player i has
violated the code of conduct profile and this was the only announcement, all players might
play the prescribed action required to implement punishment to player i. Moreover player i
may try to take advantage of this information structure by announcing somebody else has
violated the code of conduct. Therefore, two players could be pointing to each other and
it is not possible to tell who actually deviated. We rule out this mutually implication by
assuming that the self-referential game strongly permits detection meaning that the notion of
permitting detection is not reciprocal. We say that the self-referential game strongly permits
detection if for all pairs of players i, j ∈ l there exists a set of private signals Y¯ ij ⊂ Yj such
that for any profile of codes of conduct r ∈ R, and any r˜i 6= ri we have pij(Y¯ ij |r˜i, r−i) = 1
and pij(Y¯
i
j ) = 0, but for any r˜
j 6= rj it holds that pij(yj|r˜i, r−i) = pij(yj|r) for all yj ∈ Yj.
Theorem 1.5.2. Let vi = ui(s) ≥ ui for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S. If the self-referential game strongly
permits detection and is locally perfectly informative with cheap talk, then there is a code of
conduct profile r ∈ R such that the payoff vector v = (v1, . . . , vN) is a Nash equilibrium of
the self-referential game.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary profile of strategies s ∈ S such that ui(s) ≥ ui for all i ∈ I. Given
the profile of strategies, we begin with constructing the profile of codes of conduct, rˆ, that
implements ui(s) for all i.
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Let rˆi be the code of conduct that prescribes for any player i ∈ I the following: For any
player i ∈ l if he is able to unilaterally punish player j, rˆii(yi) = (∅, sji ), for any yi ∈ Y¯ ji .
Alternatively, if player i needs player k’s to punish j, he chooses rˆii(yi) = (y˜
j
i , s
j
i ) for any
yi ∈ Y¯ ji , and for some specific y˜ji ∈ Y˜0. If he does not receive any signal from the set Y¯ ji but
the message y˜ji ∈ Y˜0 to punish player j, play rˆii(yi) = (∅, sji ) where yi ∈ Yi \ Y¯ ji . In any other
case, rˆii(yi) = (∅, si) for all yi ∈ Yi \ Y¯ ji . For all players i ∈ I \ l, they choose rˆii(∅) = si, and
rˆii(∅) = sji for any y˜jk ∈ Y˜0 announced by any player k ∈ l. We now proceed to show that
this code of conduct implements the payoff proposed. If players adhere to rˆi their payoffs
are Ui(rˆ) = ui(s) for all i.
The relevant alternative code of conduct r˜i ∈ R0 for players i ∈ l is to announce somebody
else has deviated y˜ki ∈ Y˜0 and to not play the prescribed strategy by choosing s˜i ∈ Si.
There are two possible cases to consider here. First, player i announces that a player k who
cannot observe i’s play has deviated. Since there is some other player k′ 6= i, k points out
player i’s deviation and i is correspondingly punished, player i’s expected payoffs are equal
to Ui(r˜
i, rˆ−i) = ui. More interestingly, suppose player i accuses player k who does observe
i’s play and who accuses i. By strong detection, detection is unidirectional hence everyone
knows that while k observes i’s play, i does not observe k’s play, hence i should be punished
and obtains ui. From this we can conclude that the code of conduct rˆ is a Nash equilibrium
of the self-referential game.
In this theorem we require the strong version of “permits detection.” The reason for this is
simple: if players respond only to unique announcements then a player can foil the system
by violating the equilibrium code of conduct and announcing also that another player has
violated it. At worst when he is detected there will be two such announcements. This is a
fairly common strategy in criminal proceedings: try to obscure guilt by blaming everyone else.
18
However if the game strongly permits detection then we can specify that when two players
announce violations and one points to the other, then the one who has no information is
punished. What strong detection says in a sense is that there are neutral witnesses people
who observe wrong-doing but who cannot be credibly accused of wrong-doing by the wrong-
doer.
1.6 Approximate Equilibria
In this section, we ask to what extent a small probability of detecting deviations from a code
of conduct can be used to sustain approximate equilibria of the base game as strict equilibria
of the self-referential game.
We relax the detection technology assumption from last section and allow for noisy signals
instead of perfectly revealing signals. To this end, we define the notion of imperfect identifi-
cation of self-referential strategies. The self-referential game is said to E,D permit detection
where constants E,D satisfy E,D ∈ [0, 1] and E+D ≤ 1 if for every player i ∈ I there exists
some player j and a nonempty set Y¯j ⊂ Yj such that for any profile code of conduct r ∈ R,
any signal y¯j ∈ Y¯j, and any r˜i 6= ri, r˜i ∈ R0 we have pij(y¯j|r˜i, r−i) ≥ D and pij(y¯j|r) ≤ E.
We view D as the probability of detection, that is, how likely it is that player j observes
intentions of deviating from the other player i. You can think of E as the probability of
someone who is being falsely accused of cheating when he behaves honestly.
We assume that in the base game all players have access to N individual randomizing de-
vices each of which has an independent probability εR of an outcome we call punishment.
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Depending on the private signals in the self-referential game players decide whether to ignore
or not these outcomes.
For any ε ≥ 0, the strategy profile s ∈ S is an ε-Nash equilibrium if for all players i and
for any strategy s˜i 6= si it holds that ui(si, s−i)− ui(s˜i, s−i) ≥ ε. Suppose that the strategy
profile s0 is an ε0-Nash equilibrium giving utility ui(s
0) for each player i in the base game.
For any strategy profile s ∈ S and strategies sij played by player j for any pair of players
i, j ∈ I with i 6= j suppose that si = (sij, s−j) are ε1-Nash equilibria. Define for each
player i, Pi = ui(s
0) − ui(si). We assume that Pi ≥ P ≥ 0 and for some εp ≥ 0 that
|uj(si)− uj(s0)| ≤ εp. The number Pi stands for player i’s loss when punished and the
punishment must be at least P . Think of εp as a measure of the closeness of s
i to s0, that is,
a measure of how far the punishment equilibria are from the original equilibrium. Since the
base game is finite, we can denote by u, u¯ be the lowest and highest payoffs to any player in
the game. Define two parameters ε and K
ε = ε0 + (N + u¯− u)(ε1 + εp)E,
K = max{(N + u¯− u) [3N4(1 + u¯− u)] , N [N4(u¯− u+ 1)] (u¯− u)}.
Observe that K depends only on the number of players in the game, and the highest and
lowest possible utility and not, for example, the size of the strategy spaces or other details
of the game.
Theorem 1.6.1. Suppose (D(P − ε1))2 > 4Kε. Then there exists an εR and a strict Nash
equilibrium code of conduct rˆ ∈ R such that for all players i ∈ I,
∣∣ui(s0)− Ui(rˆ)∣∣ ≤ ε+D(P − ε1)−√(D(P − ε1))2 > 4Kε.
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The proof, which can be found in the Appendix, is simply a computation. The key point is
that if P > ε1 then small enough ε implies a strict Nash equilibrium of the self-referential
game giving players very nearly what they get at the approximate equilibrium. To better
understand what the theorem says let us answer the following question: When is ε small?
Not surprisingly we must have ε0 small. In addition we must either have E small or both εp
and ε1 small.
Recall that we are holding D the chance of being “caught” fixed. Here E measures how
frequently we must punish if nobody deviates. The quantities εp and ε1 measure how costly
the punishment is and how credible it is respectively. That is, if εp is large players who carry
out punishments stand to lose quite a lot compared to sticking at s0, while if ε1 is large
players have a lot of incentive to deviate from the punishments. These two forces together
make any code of conduct hard to adhere by players. But, we are able to overcome this
issue by exploiting the E,D possibility of detection. At the extreme case, when E = 0, the
parameter ε turns out to be ε0. The smaller the ε0, the closer our strict equilibrium to the
approximate equilibrium in the base game.
Holding E fixed is more problematic, because in a general game it is not clear how we can
choose punishments sij that have little cost to the punishers and are also credible. Given an
ε0-Nash equilibrium s
0 we might expect to be able to find nearby approximate equilibrium
s¯i which punishes player i, but they will not generally have the requisite form s¯i = (sij, s−j)
in which just the player j who detects i deviates and indeed it may be very hard for player
j to punish i by himself. This problem, however, can be solved by allowing cheap talk after
detection and before play: player j simply announces that he thinks that i has violated the
code of conduct, and if he is the only one to make such an announcement, then all players
play s¯i. To do this, we may use the message structure presented in Section 5 with identical
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timing. Yet, for such a procedure to work we need to strengthen the notion of “E,D permits
detection” slightly along the lines used in the perfect information case. In particular with 3
or more players, we define the notion of E,D strongly permits detection to mean that if j
detects i then i does not detect j.
One class of games that has a very rich structure of approximate equilibrium as [Radner(1980)]
pointed out, are repeated games between patient players. In the repeated game setting the
idea of choosing “equilibria” that punish the punished a lot and the punishers a little is very
close to that used in [Fudenberg and Maskin(1986)] to prove the discounted folk theorem.
Hence it is plausible that in these games we can find many strict Nash equilibria of the
self-referential game even when E is fixed and not necessarily small.
1.7 Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
In this section, our goal is to prove a folk-like theorem for games with private monitoring.
Fudenberg and Levine (1991) consider repeated discounted games with private monitoring
that are informationally connected in a way described below. They show that socially feasible
payoff vectors that Pareto dominate mutual threat points are ε-sequential equilibria where
ε goes to zero as the discount factor δ goes to one. Our goal is to show that if the game is
self-referential in a way that allows some chance that deviations from codes of conduct are
detected (no matter how small is that chance), then this result can be strengthened from
ε-sequential equilibrium to strict Nash equilibrium. We follow [Fudenberg and Levine(1991)]
in describing the setup.
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1.7.1 The Stage Game
The stage game has finite action spaces ai ∈ Ai for each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and these
are chosen simultaneously. The corresponding action profiles are denoted a ∈ A = ×iAi.
We denote by ∆(Ai) the probability distributions over the set of actions Ai with element αi,
and by α ∈ ×i∆(Ai) mixed profiles. Each player i has a finite private signal space Zi with
signal profiles written as z ∈ Z = ×iZi. Given any action profile a ∈ A, the probability of
a signal profile z ∈ Z is given by ρ(z|a). For each action profile a ∈ A, we write ρi(zi|r) for
the marginal distribution of player i over signals zi ∈ Zi. This induces also a probability
distribution for mixed actions ρ(z|α) as well as marginals over individual signals ρi(zi|α).
Utility for individual players in the stage game is denoted by wi : Zi → R which depends only
on private signal received by that player.2 This gives rise to the expected utility function
gi(a) constituting the normal form of the stage game
gi(a) =
∑
zi∈Zi
ρ(zi|a)wi(zi).
We can extend expected payoffs to mix actions profile α ∈ ∆(A) in the standard way, thus
gi(α) =
∑
a∈A
α(a)gi(a).
A mutual threat point is a payoff vector v = (vi, . . . , vN) such that there exists a mutual
punishment action - this is a mixed action profile α such that gi(α
′
i, α−i) ≤ vi for all players
i, mixed actions α′i. We say a payoff vector is mutually punishable if it weakly-Pareto
dominates a mutual threat point. As is standard, a payoff vector v is enforceable if there
is a mixed action profile α with g(α) = v, and if for some player i and some mixed action
2We may include the players own action in his signal if we wish.
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α′i, gi(α
′
i, α−i) > gi(α) then for some j 6= we have ρj(·|α′i, α−i) 6= ρj(·|α). Note that every
extremal Pareto efficient payoff is enforceable.
The enforceable mutually punishable set V ∗ is the intersection of the closure of the convex
hull of the payoff vectors that weakly Pareto dominate a mutual threat point and the closure
of the convex hull of the enforceable payoffs. We will denote by int(V ∗) the interior of the set
V ∗. Notice that this is generally a smaller set than the socially feasible individually rational
set both because there may be unenforceable actions, but also because the minmax point
may not be mutually punishable.3
We now describe the notion of informational connectedness. Roughly this says that it is
possible for players to communicate with each other even when one of them tries to prevent
the communication from taking place. In a two player game there is no issue, so we give
definitions in the case N > 2. We say that player i is directly connected to player j 6= i
despite player k 6= j, i if there exists a mixed profile α and mixed action αˆi 6= αi for player i
such that the marginal distribution of player j satisfies
ρj(·|αˆi, α′i, α−(i,k)) 6= ρj(·|α) for all α′k.
In words, this condition requires that given α being played any player i’s deviation will be
detected by some player j regardless of player k’s play. We say that i is connected to j if
for every k 6= i, j there is a sequence of players i1, . . . , in with i1 = i, in = j and ip 6= k for
3[Fudenberg and Levine(1991)] prove only that the enforceable mutually punishable set contains approx-
imate equilibria leaving open the question of when the larger socially feasible individually rational set might
have this property. They construct approximate equilibria using mutual punishment, so in particular there
is no effort to punish the specific player who deviates. This is necessary because they do not impose infor-
mational restrictions sufficient to guarantee that it is possible to determine who deviated. With additional
informational restrictions of the type imposed in [Fudenberg et al.(1994)Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin] it
is likely that their methods would yield a stronger result. As this is a limitation of the original result, we do
not pursue the issue here.
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any p such that player ip is directly connected to player ip+1 despite player k. Intuitively, we
can always find a “network” between players i and j so that the message goes through no
matter what other single player tries to do. The game is informationally connected if there
are only two players, or if every player is connected to every other player.
1.7.2 The Repeated Game
We now consider the T repeated game with discounting, where we allow both T finite and
T = ∞. A history for player i at time t is a sequence of actions taken and private signals
observed until period t denoted by hti = (a
1
i , z
1
i , . . . , a
t
i, z
t
i) while h
0
i = ∅ is the null history.
The set of all t-length private histories for player i is denoted by H ti = (Ai×Zi)t. We denote
by H t the set of all histories of length t. Consequently we can define the set of histories
H =
⋃
tH
t and the set of all private histories for player i given by Hi =
⋃
tH
t
i . A behavior
strategy for player i is a sequence of maps σti taking his private history h
t−1
i to a probability
distribution over Ai, that is, σi : Hi → ∆Ai. We write σ for the profile of behavior strategies.
Players have common discount factor δ < 1. For some discount factor δ we let ui(σ; δ, T )
denote expected average present value for the game repeated T periods.
In this repeated game a strategy profile σ is an ε′-Nash equilibrium for ε′ ≥ 0 if ui(σ; δ, T ) +
ε′ ≥ ui(σ′i, σ−i; δ, T ) for σ′i 6= σi, for each player i. Combining Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 from
[Fudenberg and Levine(1991)] we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1.7.1 ([Fudenberg and Levine(1991)]). In an informationally connected game if
v ∈ V ∗ then there exists a sequence of discount factors δn → 1, non-negative numbers εn → 0
and strategy profiles σn such that σn is an εn-Nash equilibrium
4 for δn and u(σn; δn,∞)→ v.
4[Fudenberg and Levine(1991)] prove a stronger result - they show that σn is an εn-sequential equilibrium
which means also that losses from time t deviations measured in time t average present value and not merely
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We will require one other result from [Fudenberg and Levine(1991)]. Their Lemma A.2
together with their construction in the proof of Theorem 4.1 implies that it is possible to
construct a communication phase with length L.
Lemma 1.7.1 ([Fudenberg and Levine(1991)]). For any β ∈ (0, 1) there exist a pair of
strategies σi, σ
′
i and for each player j 6= i a test Zj ⊂ {(z1j , . . . , zLj )} such that for any player
k 6= i, j and strategy σ′k by player k, under (σi, σ′k, σ−(i,k)) we have Pr((z1−(i,j), . . . , zL−(i,j)) ∈
Z−(i,j)) ≤ 1− β, and under (σ′i, σ′k, σ−(i,k)) we have Pr((z1−(i,j), . . . , zL−(i,j)) ∈ Z−(i,j)) ≥ β .
This says that a player can “communicate” by using his actions whether or not someone has
deviated. In fact, such communication between players is guaranteed by the assumption of
information connectedness.
1.7.3 The Finitely Repeated Self-Referential Game
In the self-referential case it is convenient to work with finite versions of the repeated game.
The T -discrete version of the game has finite time horizon T and players have access each
period to independent randomization devices that provide a uniform over T different out-
comes.
The self-referential T -discrete game consists of signal spaces Yi for each player i, codes of
conduct space RT , and the signal probabilities are given by piT (·|r).
Next we state the main result of the paper:
Theorem 1.7.2. If V ∗ has non-empty interior, if the game is informationally connected, if
for some E ≥ 0, D > 0 the self-referential T discrete versions E,D permits detection, and if
time t average present value are no bigger than εn. As we do not need it, we do not give the extra definitions
required to state the stronger result.
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v ∈ int(V ∗) then for any ε0 there exists a sufficiently large discount factor δ, a discretization
T and strategy pairs s0i , s
j
i for all players i, j ∈ I such that s0 is an ε0-Nash equilibrium for
δ, T , ε1 = εp = ε0, P = 3
√
ε0 and (D(P − ε1))2 > 4Kε.
Proof. First note that by choosing T large enough for given δ it is immediate that ε0-Nash
equilibria of the base game are 2ε0-Nash equilibria of the discretized game, so Theorem
7.1 applies directly to the discretized game. Theorem 7.1 immediately implies that for all
sufficiently large δ we can find a sequence of discount factors with δn ≥ δ and corresponding
Tn together with strategies s¯
0, s¯1, . . . , s¯Nsuch that these are all ε/2-Nash equilibria, that
|u(s¯0)− v| < ε0/2, ui(s¯0)− ui(s¯i) ≥ 3√ε0 and |uj(s¯i)− uj(s¯0)| < ε0/2.
To construct s0i , s
j
i we begin the game with a series of communication phases. We go through
the players j = 1, . . . , N in order each phase lasting L periods. In the first j-th phase the
player i 6= j who is able to detect deviations by player j has two strategies sˆji , sˆj
′
i and
players k 6= i, j have a strategy sˆjk from Lemma 7.2. In s0i player i plays the L truncation
of sˆji , alternatively in s
j
i he plays the L truncation of sˆ
j′
i . The remaining players play the L
truncation of sˆjk.
In s0, at the end of these NL periods of communication each player conducts the test in
Lemma 7.2 to see who has sent a signal. The test is used just like cheap talk in the earlier
results. If it indicates that exactly one player i has sent a signal he plays his part of the
equilibrium s¯j punishing player j. If the test indicates that exactly two players i, j sent
a signal where i reports that j has deviated then he plays his part of the equilibrium s¯j
punishing j. Otherwise he plays s¯0. By Lemma 7.2 by choosing sufficiently large L the
probability β under any of the strategies s0, sj that all players agree that a single player i
sent a signal (since in fact at most one player has actually sent a signal) or that no signal
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was sent may be as close to as we wish. In particular we may choose β close enough to 1
that play following disagreement or agreement on more than one player sending a signal has
no more than an ε0/4 effect on payoffs.
Observe that this choice of L does not depend at all on δn, Tn, so we may choose δn and Tn
large enough that nothing that happens in the communications phase makes more than a
ε0/4 difference to payoffs. This shows that s
0
i , s
j
i have the desired properties.
Notice that the structure of Theorem 1.7.2 differs from that of Theorem 1.7.1 in an important
way. In Theorem 1.7.1 very precise information is accumulated on how players have played,
and a mutual punishment is used, but so infrequently on the equilibrium path it has little
cost. By way of contrast, in Theorem 1.7.2 we have fixed E. This means that we must make
sure that the cost to the punishers is small relative to the cost to the punished. If not, it
would be optimal to accept a small punishment in exchange for not having to dish out a
costly one. Hence we cannot rely on mutual punishments, but must target them towards the
“guilty.”
1.8 Conclusion
The standard world of economic theory is one of perfect liars - a world where Nigerian
scammers have no difficulty passing themselves off as English businessmen. In practice
social norms are complicated and there is some chance that a player will inadvertently
reveal his intention to violate a social norm through mannerisms or other indications of
lying. Here we investigate a simple model in which this is the case. Our setting is that of
self-referential games, which allows the possibility of observing directly opponents intentions.
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We characterized the self-referential nature of this class of games by defining codes of conduct.
Adhering to a code of conduct represents agreement between players that even have different
roles and allows us to extend the setup studied by [Levine and Pesendorfer(2007)] to games
with more than two players.
We have examined when and how codes of conduct matter. In particular, we think of codes
of conduct as computer algorithm which goes beyond the interpretation that players submit
computer programs to play. In fact, recent anthropological research suggests human genes
are programmed as computer codes and behavior recognition between humans ranges from
odor to visual cues.
Results obtained in the perfect recognition case have the flavor of folk theorems. This is
possible because of perfect revealing signals that point at deviations from code of conduct
and hence deviators are punished with certainty. Also, we weaken the assumption about who
actually observe these signals. If the set of players receive these signals are endowed with the
possibility of communication, the results hold. That is, players that detect deviations use a
message structure to communicate with other players needed to implement a punishment.
In practice the probability of detection is not likely to be perfect, so we then focus on the case
where the detection probability is small. The key idea is that a little chance of detection can
go a long way. Small probabilities of detecting deviation from a code of conduct allow us to
sustain approximate equilibria as strict equilibria of the self-referential version of the game.
An illustrative, but far more important, application of this result is a discounted strict Nash
folk-like theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We conclude that approximate
equilibria can be sustained as “real” equilibria when there is a chance of detecting violations
of codes of conduct.
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1.9 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1.6.1
Proof of Theorem 1.6.1. First we bound the possibility that the “punishment” event occurs
on more than one randomization device at the same time. Recall that each individual
operates N randomizing devices in case they should have to report on more than one person.
Hence there are N2 independent randomization devices in operations. Thus, the event
“punishment” does not occur to any player has probability (1− εR)N2 . The probability that
the event “punishment” occurs exactly once is N2εR(1−εR)N2−1. From these results we find
the probability that the event “punishment” occurs twice or more and an upper bound for
this probability
1− (1− εR)N2 −N2εR(1− εR)N2−1 ≤ N2εR −N2εR
[
1− (N2 − 1)εR
]
= N2(N2 − 1)(εR)2 ≤ N4(εR)2
Now we define the code of conduct rˆi ∈ R0: for all players i ∈ I, if y¯i ∈ Y¯i and the event
“punishment” occurs play rˆii(yi) = s
j
i and rˆ
i
j(yj) = s
0
j for any yj ∈ Yj and all players j 6= i,
otherwise play rˆii(yi) = s
0
i for all yi ∈ Yi \ Y¯i and for all j 6= i choose rˆij(yj) = s0j for any
yj ∈ Yj \ Y¯j. We will show under what circumstances the profile of codes of conduct hatr is
a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential game. The following mutually exclusive events can
occur to player i when all players j ∈ I \ {i} choose the code of conduct rˆj, but he chooses
r˜i defined below where r˜ij = rˆ
i
j for all j ∈ I \ {i}:
1. Nobody is punished: if the code of conduct rˆi is followed by player i, he gets ui(s
0),
if i deviates by choosing the code of conduct r˜i that prescribes another strategy s˜i ∈
Si, s˜i 6= s0i he gets at most ui(s0) + ε0,
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2. Player j is the only player punished: if rˆi is followed i gets ui(s
j), if i deviates by
choosing r˜i that prescribes no punishment to player j, r˜ii(y¯i) 6= sj, he gets at most
ui(s
j) + ε1,
3. Two or more players are punished: if rˆi is followed player i gets at worst u, if i deviates
while choosing r˜i(yi) = s˜i with s˜i ∈ Si and s˜i 6= sij 6= s0j he gets at most u¯.
Hence if all players follow the code of conduct rˆi, player i gets no more than
ui(s
0) + (1− (1− E)N) [εp +N4(εR)2(u¯− u)] ,
and no less than
ui(s
0)− (1− (1− E)N) [εp +N4(εR)2(u¯− u)]− pij(y¯j|rˆ)εRPi.
Suppose player i violates the code of conduct profile rˆ and chooses an alternative code of
conduct r˜i like the one we described above. He gets no more than
ui(s
0) + ε0 + (1− (1−E)N)
[
ε1 +N
4(εR)
2(u¯− u)]− [(pij(y¯j|rˆ) +D)εR −N4(εR)2] (Pi + ε1).
Consequently, the gain to violating the code of conduct profile rˆ is at most
ε0 + (1− (1− E)N)
[
ε1 + εp + 2N
4(εR)
2(u¯− u)]+ pij(y¯j|rˆ)εRPi
− [(pij(y¯j|rˆ) +D)εR −N4(εR)2] (Pi − ε1)
≤ ε0 + (N + u¯− u)E
[
ε1 + εp + 3N
4(εR)
2(1 + u¯− u)]−DεR(P − ε1)
≤ ε+Kε2R −DεR(P − ε1)
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Hence if (D(P − ε1))2 > 4Kε then there is a strict Nash equilibrium with
∣∣ui(s0)− Ui(rˆ)∣∣ ≤ NEεp +N [N4(u¯− u) + 1] (u¯− u)εR
≤ ε+ 2KεR.
We conclude by solving the inequality for εR. The roots of the quadratic equation are
εR =
D(P − ε1)±
√
(D(P − ε1))2 − 4Kε
2K
which gives two real roots since (D(P − ε1))2 > 4Kε, implying the existence of an εR for
which rˆ is strict Nash equilibrium of the self-referential game. Plugging the lower root into
the inequality for the utility difference |ui(s0)− Ui(rˆ)| gives the remainder of the result.
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Chapter 2
Codes of Conduct and Bad
Reputation
2.1 Introduction
A variety of economic long-run relationships—such as mechanic-motorists, doctor-patients
and advisor-students—in which reputation concerns may lead to inefficiencies and even to
complete market breakdowns were modeled by [Ely and Va¨lima¨ki(2003), henceforth EV].
More recently, however, [Grosskopf and Sarin(2010)] found experimental evidence that shows
that reputation is not as harmful as EV propose it should be. In addition, data suggests that
markets that fit the assumptions in their model are not subject to breakdowns, for example,
mitral valve surgeries or automobile repair.5
5In mitral valve surgeries there are two main categories: valve repair and valve replacement. Both
surgeries are equally successful when properly conducted by the surgeon. To illustrate the idea, suppose
that we have normal and bad surgeons. The bad physician always does valve replacement but the normal
one may perform the necessary surgery. Patients only observe the type of surgery conducted. This market is
analogous to the mechanic-motorists example in EV. In the US, on the other hand, more than 40,000 mitral
valve operations are performed every year.
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In this paper, I study a bad reputation game that extends the model of [Ely et al.(2008)Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine],
who characterize bad reputation in general. The present model incorporates agents that are
capable of recognising an opponent’s intentions (i.e., self-referentiality) and the possibility
that the long-lived agent with reputation concerns can be replaced. These two features are
common to the situations mentioned above, and the results here reconcile the fact that these
markets remain functioning.
In the bad reputation game, a long-run player, whose actions are imperfectly observable,
faces a sequence of myopic agents. Previous interactions are revealed through public sig-
nals. There are two types of long-run players: strategic and committed players. The main
characteristic of these games is that short-run players participate in the game whenever they
expect a friendly action, conditioning this decision on public history. However, friendly ac-
tions may lead to bad signals that can be interpreted as evidence of an unfriendly action
by myopic agents, thereby deciding to exit the game even if the long-lived player has been
playing friendly actions. The long-run player forgoes current payoffs for future reputation
by playing unfriendly actions that might give evidence of good behavior, as a result, the
contemporaneous and subsequent short-run players step out of the game.
The possibility of renewal is, for instance, surgeons that shift during a valve operation. In-
deed, renewal has a dual effect. First, the long-run player might be replaced in the subsequent
period, providing less incentive for him to play friendly (e.g., conduct the right surgery). Sec-
ond, short-run players are unaware whether a replacement has occurred, thereby implying
that a history of bad signals (i.e., valve replacement) weighs less in the updating of poste-
riors. Note that renewal would not overcome the problem of perverse reputation because
the long-run player finds it more difficult to separate from unfriendly types with the rich
commitment type space which is assumed here.
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The idea of self-referentiality relies on agents’ rules of behavior that are costly to change,
motivated by the possibility that humans may reveal their states of mind, for example,
through body gestures (as in [Frank(1988)]). Such rules, that were first introduced by
[Levine and Pesendorfer(2007)], are modeled in the self-referential game as codes of conduct
that are conditioned on signals that in turn are determined by a probability distribution
that depends on everyone’s choices of strategies. Intuitively, players have the chance of
discerning whether opponents conform to the same rule of behavior. Closely related to this
work is [Block and Levine(2012)] who build the self-referential framework used here. (See
also [Kalai et al.(2010)Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet].)
In the benchmark case, I first consider perfect identification about opponents’ codes of
conduct where self-referentiality overturns the bad reputation effect, thereby showing that
the precommitment action outcome can be induced in equilibrium (Theorem 2.3.1). When
there is imperfect information about codes of conduct, on the other hand, self-referentiality
is no longer sufficient to overcome this problem because myopic players cannot rely only on
intentions to discern types. The main result of the paper (Theorem 2.4.1) entails that self-
referentiality complements renewal of the long-run player and that there exists an equilibrium
in which the long-run player approximately obtains his precommitment payoff.
The literature includes models with the flavor of bad reputation games, such as [Morris(2001)]
who shows that an advisor would not report truthfully if he might be thought to be biased
and by lying he avoids being tagged as inaccurate. As a result, with reputation concerns
there is no transmission of information in equilibrium. Recently, [Bar-Isaac and Deb(2013)]
examine a reputation model with heterogenous audiences. Whenever these audiences cannot
observe agent’s actions simultaneously a bad reputation effect arises. The reason is that in
the attempt to build a reputation towards one audience the agent takes unfriendly actions
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regarding the other audience. In credit markets, [Ordon˜ez(2013)] finds that under some
conditions in the fundamentals of the economy, in equilibrium borrowers might invest in
risky projects that are bad from the perspective of the lender.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2.1, I describe the framework. In Section 2.3
and 2.4, I present the main results, and in Section 2.5 I relate them to EV example. Section
2.6 shows the necessity of renewal with imperfect observation. In Section 2.7, I conclude.
All proofs are included in the Appendix.
2.2 Setup
A long-run player, player 1, faces a sequence of different short-run players, player 2 in a
repeated game with finite horizon T . In the stage-game, player 1 chooses an action a ∈ A
and player 2 chooses an action b ∈ B.
There are finite privately known types for player 1, θ ∈ Θ. Let the common prior distribution
over types be the probability measure µ0 ∈ ∆(Θ) with µ0(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. The normal
θ0 is strategic, and the commitment types θ(a) always plays some action a ∈ A. The stage-
game payoff functions are ui : A×B → R for i = 1, 2. The long-run player discounts future
with δ ∈ (0, 1). In the repeated game, the normal type maximizes the discounted sum of
expected payoffs whereas commitment types plays mechanically the stage action a.
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There exists the possibility of renewing the long-run player, that is exponentially distributed
with probability ν ∈ (0, 1). Every period, the long-run player might be replaced by either a
normal or a commitment type. The new type θ is drawn according to µ0.
6
Here I follow the setup developed by [Ely et al.(2008)Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine] when de-
scribing bad reputation games.7 At the end of the stage game, a public signal y is observed
from finite space Y . Given an action profile (a, b), y ∈ Y is drawn according to the probabil-
ity distribution ρ(·|a, b) ∈ ∆(Y ). Short-run players are restricted to observe public signals.
Let H t = Y t be the set of all t-length public history with element ht = (y1, . . . , yt), h
0 = ∅,
and H =
⋃
t≥1 Y
t. The private history of the long-run player is ht1 = (a1, . . . , at−1) which
belongs to H t1 = A
t, and let H1 =
⋃
t≥1H
t
1.
The behavior strategy of the long-run player is a mapping σ1 : H ×H1 ×Θ→ ∆A := A. A
strategy for the short-run player is a sequence of maps σ2(h
t) ∈ ∆B := B. Then, a short-run
action β ∈ B is a Nash response to action α ∈ A if u2(α, β) ≥ u2(α, βˆ) for all βˆ ∈ B. Let B
be the best-response correspondence and B(α) be the set of short-run Nash responses to α.
Bad reputation games are a subclass of participation games in which short-run players may
not to participate in the game. They stay out by choosing an exit action e ∈ E, whereas
entry actions belong to B −E. Let Y E ⊆ Y be the set of exit signals. Given an exit action,
only exit signals are possible. In addition, when entry actions are chosen none of the exit
signals can be observed. A game is a participation game if the exit action set is non-empty
E 6= ∅ and there exists some action α with B(α) ∩ E 6= ∅.
6The literature on impermanent types includes, for instance, [Holmstro¨m(1999)],
[Mailath and Samuelson(2001)], [Phelan(2006)], [Wiseman(2008), Wiseman(2009)], and
[Ekmekci et al.(2012)Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson].
7To lighten notation, some formal definitions are included in the Appendix.
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Throughout, β{E} denotes the probability assigned to E, by Nash response action β. A
non-empty finite set of pure actions F ∈ A is friendly if there is a number γ > 0 such that, for
all α ∈ A if the short-run player strategy is a Nash response β ∈ B(α) and β{E} < 1 then
the long-run player assigns positive probability α(f) ≥ γ for some f ∈ F . An unfriendly
set N corresponding to F is any non-empty subset of A \ F . In words, it says that Nash
response of short-run players puts positive probability to non-exit actions when friendly
actions are likely to be played. Any non-friendly action makes short-run players choose an
exit action. We say α is enforceable if for every α˜, β with β ∈ B(α) and β{E} < 1, such
that u1(α˜, β) > u1(α, β) then ρ(·|α˜, β) 6= ρ(·|α, β).8
Let Θ(F ) and Θ(N) be the friendly and unfriendly commitment types, respectively. It
follows that Θ(N)∩Θ(F ) = ∅. A set of signals Y is evidence for N if each action in N gives
rise to a higher probability for every signal in Y than any action not in N . An action a is
vulnerable to temptation relative to Y if by playing the temptation action d the long-run
player reduces the probability of bad signals by at least ρ and increases all signals but in
Y ∪ Y E by factor 1 + ρ˜. We say an action d is a costly temptation if it is a temptation and
u1(a, b)−u1(d, b) ≥ c with c > 0 for all b ∈ B−E. A participation game has exit minmax if
max
b∈E∩B
max
a∈A
u1(a, b) = min
β∈B
max
a∈A
u1(a, β).
A participation game is a bad reputation game if it has exit minmax, and there is a friendly
set F , corresponding non-empty unfriendly set N and a set of signals Y that are evidence
for N , such that every enforceable friendly action f is vulnerable to temptation relative to
the set of signals Y . Signals in Y are called bad signals. A bad reputation game with costly
temptation exhibits a costly set of temptations.
8The idea of identification of actions was proposed by [Fudenberg et al.(1994)Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin].
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2.2.1 The Self-Referential Game
Consider a generic finite base game Γ. There is a set of players, I = {1, . . . , N}, and for
each player i a set of strategies, si ∈ Si, and a payoff function, ui : ×iSi → R.
The self-referential game is defined on Γ so it inherits the set of players I. There is a finite
set of private signals Zi 3 zi for each player i such that |Zi| ≥ 2. The strategy of player i is
defined as code of conduct, ri, which is an |I|×1 vector whose jth element corresponds to the
mapping from the set of player j’s private signals to player j’s strategies in the base game.
The common space of such codes of conduct is R0 := {ri | rij : Zj → Sj for all i, j}. It requires
each player to decide how he will play and how he thinks all the other players will play.
Denote the profile of codes of conduct r ∈ R. Given r, the probability distribution of private
signals is pi(z|r). The profile of codes of conduct rˆ is a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential
game if for all players i we have that rˆi ∈ argmaxr˜i
∑
z∈Z ui(r
1
1(z1), . . . , r
N
N (zN))pi(z|r).
The timing of the self-referential game is as follows: before observing any signal and playing
the base game, all players simultaneously choose codes of conduct. Given this choice, a profile
of private signals is drawn from the probability distribution pi(z|r). After observing private
signals, players execute codes of conduct rii(zi) = si. Let G(Γ) denote the self-referential
game defined upon the base game Γ that is a bad reputation game throughout this paper.
2.3 Benchmark Case: Perfect Identification
As a benchmark, it is useful to examine the case when players have perfectly revealing signals
about codes of conduct that were chosen by opponents. I show that we can sustain “good”
equilibria regardless of the long-run player’s patience and how frequently he leaves the game.
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Formally, we say a self-referential game permits detection if for every player i, all players
j 6= i there exists a set Zij ⊂ Zj such that for every r ∈ R and any code of conduct r˜i 6= ri,
we have pij(Z
i
j|r˜i, r−i) = 1 and pij(Zij|r) = 0. This definition says that any deviation is
detectable by all players in the game. Let f ∗ ∈ F be the precommitment friendly action of
the long-lived player.
Theorem 2.3.1. Consider a bad reputation game Γ with any ν and δ. Suppose that the
self-referential game G(Γ) permits detection. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium of G(Γ)
where the payoff of the normal long-run player is u1(f
∗, β), and β ∈ B(f ∗).
See the Appendix for the proof.
In the canonical bad reputation game Γ, short-run players try to anticipate whether player
1 would choose a friendly action f ∈ F , had he entered the game b ∈ B − E. With perfectly
revealing signals, on the other hand, public history ht is irrelevant to myopic players because
they can condition actions only on what the long-run player will be doing through signals
z2 ∈ Z2. Thus, player 1 would not need to regain the short-run players’ faith after a history
of bad signals (i.e., ys ∈ ht for many s ≤ t) but he might find it optimal to choose an
unfriendly action a ∈ N . However, he will never choose a ∈ N in equilibrium, since doing
so would ensure him a punishment immediately and thereafter, getting his minmax payoff
0. By focusing on this benchmark case, we may consider restrictive situations, but most
importantly it shows that there is no room for reputation building.
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2.4 Identification with Noise
In this section, I consider the case where private signals about codes of conduct are noisy. A
self-referential game is said to λ, η permits detection with constants λ, η ∈ [0, 1] if for every
player i there exists some player j 6= i and a set Zj ⊂ Zj, such that for any r ∈ R, any signal
zj ∈ Zj and any code of conduct r˜i ∈ R0 where r˜i 6= ri we have pij(zj|r˜i, r−i)− pij(zj|r) ≥ η
and pij(zj|r) ≤ λ. In words, η measures the probability of detection if any player i deviates,
and λ can be interpreted as the probability of accusing someone who is being honest. It
is convenient to assume that all short-run players obtain the same private signal about the
long-lived player’s intentions in turn.9
It is necessary to impose uniformity to avoid the possibility of a relatively too high prior
probability of unfriendly types. We say a bad reputation game with friendly set F and un-
friendly set N has uniformly friendly commitment size ψ, χ with χ > 0 if the prior probability
of friendly and unfriendly types µ0[Θ(N)], µ0[Θ(F )] satisfy
µ0[Θ(N)] ≤ ψ
(
1− µ0[Θ(F )] + µ0[Θ(F )]
1+η
η
)
− χ.
The constant ψ reflects the uniformity of friendly types µ0[Θ(F )] relative to unfriendly types
µ0[Θ(N)]. Players use their private signals to update their prior probabilities about commit-
ment types to a limited extent, therefore a relatively high likelihood of friendly commitment
types is necessary to guarantee participation.
Next, the main result of the paper:
9This assumption ensures that myopic players do not infer anything about others’ draw.
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Theorem 2.4.1. Assume a bad reputation game Γ with uniformly friendly commitment size
1 − γ, χ for some χ > 0 and with costly temptation. Suppose that G(Γ) the self-referential
game η, λ permits detection. For f ∗ ∈ F and any δ, there exist η˜ > 0, λ˜ and ν˜ such that for
η ≥ η˜, λ ≤ λ˜, and ν ≥ ν˜ there is Nash equilibrium of G(Γ) where the payoff of the normal
long-run player is approximately u1(f
∗, β) with β ∈ B(f ∗).
The outline of the proof is as follows. By the η-λ detection technology, agents may adhere to
a code of conduct that prescribes a profile of friendly actions and participation unless there
is evidence of deviations. Unlike the case with perfectly revealing signals, short-run players
cannot rely only on signals z2 to predict whether friendly actions are likely to be chosen.
That is, they consider both public history, ht, and private signals, z2, when updating beliefs
on player 1’s type, i.e. µ(θ)(ht, z2) for θ ∈ Θ.
Then, for any T and any z2 /∈ Z2, the probability of renewal ν˜ (under any history of just bad
signals yt) provides an upper bound on posteriors such that any myopic player participates
in the game, that depends on parameters η and λ. As a result, it guarantees that players will
not exit whenever informative signals point out adherence, notwithstanding the realisation
of bad public signals. As is standard, while constructing equilibrium we focus on patient
enough long-run players, implying that ν affects such player’s behavior. In fact, the critical
value ν˜ was calculated so that myopic players do not exit with bad histories. It suffices then
to restrict attention to stage-game incentives, therefore finding a parameterization of η˜ and
λ˜ such that the long-run player chooses friendly actions. Because we separate the effects of
renewal from the chances of being detected whenever player 1 deviates, the proposed code
of conduct profile forms a Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 2.1: Space of prior distributions.
I end this section by illustrating the main result in [Ely et al.(2008)Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine],
and relating them to those presented here. Figure 2.1 represents the set of possible prior
probabilities on normal, bad and Stackelberg types. The upper triangle region (region B)
depicts the cases where short-run players enter irrespective of the behavior of the normal
type long-run player. In this case reputation is always good. On the other hand, region A
represents the cases when the probability of the bad type is so high that none of short-run
players participate. [Ely et al.(2008)Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine] show that in the region be-
low the dashed curve (region C) the bad reputation effect also arises. Moreover, the curve
asymptotically reaches the lower left vertex. This implies that for any arbitrary perturbation
of the complete information case, the bad reputation effect occurs.
In contrast, with self-referentiality and renewal a reputation may not be bad for any epsilon
neighborhood of the complete information case. From their result we cannot delimit where
reputation is bad or good (between regions B and C), whereas the characterisation proposed
here holds for the entire space of priors. More specifically, I have shown that the bad
reputation effect occurs with self-referentiality (Region D), which is a subset of their region
A. Finally, the higher the precision of the probability of detecting deviation from the code
of conduct, the easier it is to overcome the bad reputation effect in the self-referential game.
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2.5 Ely-Va¨lima¨ki Example
In this section, I explore the implications of the previous results in the context of EV’s
example. The bad reputation game in EV consists of a long-run player, a mechanic, and
a sequence of short-run players, the customers. There are two equally likely i.i.d. states
of the world ω ∈ {E , T } that are not directly observable by customers and these states
represent what type of repair the car needs: engine replacement E , or tune-up T . The
action space of the mechanic is A = {ee, et, te, tt} where te reads for tune-up in state E and
engine replacement in state T . The customer’s action choices are to hire the mechanic In
or to not hire the mechanic Out. The public outcomes are Y = {e, t, Out} with distribution
ρ described by ρ(Out|(·, Out)) = 1, and the corresponding announcements ρ(e|(et, In)) =
ρ(e|(te, In)) = 1
2
, ρ(e|(ee, In)) = 1 and ρ(e|(tt, In)) = 0.
If the mechanic performs the correct repair in each state and the costumer plays In, both
receive a payoff of u. Otherwise, given participation, both get −w with w > u > 0. Alter-
natively, if the customer plays Out both players get utility 0. I consider the finite horizon
version of this game. The set of friendly and unfriendly actions are F = {et} and N = {ee},
respectively. Where e is evidence for the set {ee}. The enforceable friendly action et is
vulnerable relative to e and the temptation action is tt.
Suppose that there are two types, a normal type with payoffs specified above and a com-
mitment bad type that always plays ee. EV show that the normal long-run player’s payoffs
vanish to zero as δ → 1. Roughly, the myopic players’ posterior probability that the me-
chanic is of the bad type is increasing in realizations of the signal e. Then, there exists
some threshold on the number of bad signals e such that the myopic player decides to exit
the game, whereby the mechanic would choose the action tt if he were to delay this critical
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period. In contrast to EV, in this paper the mechanic’s type may change over time and all
commitment types are possible, i.e. Θ = {θ0, θee, θet, θte, θtt}. Observe that renewal would
not mitigate the bad reputation effect because if the long-lived player mimics the Stackelberg
type, θet, the resulting empirical distribution is the same as if he were a commitment type
θte.
Consider the self-referential game that consists of the mechanic’s set of signals Z1 = {c, nc}
and customer’s Z2 = {m, g}. Denote m the T × 1 vector with all entries filled by m.
Starting with perfect revealing signals, let the distribution pi be characterized as follows:
pi((nc,m)|r˜i, r−i) = 1 and pi((nc,m)|r) = 0 for all players i. The next result states that
the good equilibrium can be recovered in EV example and is an immediate consequence of
Theorem 2.3.1.
Proposition 2.5.1. Suppose there are normal and unfriendly commitment types for the
mechanic, i.e. Θ = {θ0, θee}, then the mechanic gets a normalized discounted payoff of u in
the Nash equilibrium of the self-referential game.
As mentioned above, when signals are perfectly informative in the equilibrium of the self-
referential game the long-run player does not build reputation. Therefore, the normal me-
chanic need not choose a temptation action while pursuing to separate from the bad type
because customers can distinguish his type without error. This proposition suggests that a
normal mechanic would prefer to adhere to a code of conduct under which he chooses the
friendly action et if the institutional environment in which the interaction with customers
happens is sufficiently transparent.
In the imperfect detection case, to clarify the role of renewal I confine attention to the
stage-game for two reasons. First, it simplifies the details of the proof without computing
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the required probability of renewal as in Theorem 2.4.1. Second, the constructed code of
conduct profile would highlight the connection between noisy signals and the replacement of
the mechanic (and more general of the long-run player, see Section 2.6).
Next, assume that pi((nc,m)|r) = p and pi((nc,m)|r˜i, r−i) = q with q ≥ p for all players i.
It says that the profile of signals (c,g) is more likely to be observed if all players adhere to
the same code of conduct. Suppose that there is also a Stackelberg type, θet. Let µ
∗ be the
prior probability of unfriendly type that induces entry of short-run players whenever there
are only Stackelberg and bad types in the version of the game without self-referentiality.
Proposition 2.5.2. Assume that Θ = {θ0, θee, θet} in the one-shot version of the game.
Then, there exists a self-referential equilibrium code of conduct profile r such that µ∗ ≤ µ∗(g)
and the mechanic is hired.
The reason why the requirement on the prior of the bad type is relaxed is as follows. In
equilibrium, signal g is associated with the possibility of friendly action et, as long as cus-
tomers hire the mechanic. Therefore, the realization of g may identify adherence both by the
normal and by the Stackelberg type. At the same time, the bad type θee would not adhere to
the proposed code of conduct. As a result, the fact that the normal type is pooling with the
Stackelberg type makes the upper bound on the customers’ beliefs less stringent. This code
of conduct vector, on the other hand, cannot be a Nash equilibrium in the self-referential
repeated game (see Section 2.6 for a further discussion).
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2.6 Bad Reputation Games without Renewal
Now, I turn to the discussion about the assumption that the long-run player can be renewed
given by the probability ν. Suppose that detecting deviations from the code of conduct
profile is imperfect, η-λ permit detection, and that there is no renewal, ν = 0, I will show
that the bad reputation effect persists for an arbitrary long horizon.
As the number of signals y grows, myopic players update their beliefs regarding the long-
run player’s type, becoming virtually convinced that they are facing a bad type. With
informative signals from the self-referential framework, such histories would be undermined
only by a minuscule portion, eventually, these signals shake beliefs just not enough to make
short-run players participate in the game. Because I am interested in arbitrary long horizon
T , with probability one in any equilibrium of the self-referential game the short-run players
would exit, thereby unraveling the possibility that the long-run player gets an expected
payoff greater than his minmax payoff.
More specifically, at the beginning of each period t, the short-run player combines information
contained in the public history, ht, and information about player 1’s intentions of play,
z2 ∈ Z2, to infer the likelihood of friendly actions f ∈ F . For an arbitrary long horizon T ,
a history full of bad signals h
t
= (y1, . . . , yt) would make short-run players exit the game
because self-referential signals modify posterior beliefs by a fixed boost while not overturning
the incentives for the long-run player to separate from the bad types. In addition, the
assumption of replacement is crucial for short-run players updating beliefs so as the following
proposition focuses on short-run players’ behavior.
Proposition 2.6.1. Consider the code of conduct profile constructed in Theorem 2.4.1.
Then,
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(a) For z2 /∈ Z2, ht ∈ H, we have µ(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] < µ(ht)[Θ(N)];
(b) For z2 ∈ Z2, ht ∈ H, µ(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] > µ(ht)[Θ(N)];
(c) Assume an arbitrary long horizon T , there exists a number k∗ of bad signals y such that
short-run players do not participate in the game.
When players observe noisy signals, the posterior probability µ(ht, z2) weighs a bad signal
yt as evidence of an unfriendly commitment type, θ ∈ Θ(N). The code of conduct vector
reduces the weight on such types whenever that realization is complemented with a signal
z2 /∈ Z2, thereby requiring a higher number of bad signals to convince short-run players to
exit. Conversely, private signals in z2 ∈ Z2 jointly with a history ht imply a greater posterior
probability. Finally, part (c) points out a potential problem with pursing to sustain friendly
actions by using the code of conduct profile used in Proposition 2.5.2. Since short-run players
increase the posterior probability of unfriendly commitment types with each observation of
a bad signal, eventually µ(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] > 1− γ for any z2 ∈ Z2 and any ht with k∗ signals
in Y .
2.7 Conclusion
I have presented a model of bad reputation games with impermanent types and agents’
ability to detect intentions. The results suggest that the perverse effect of reputation is
attenuated in this class of games. In addition, I have identified conditions on the likelihood
of commitment types for such results to hold. In that sense this characterisation is more
complete than previous research. As mentioned, there is experimental evidence showing that
reputation is not as bad as the original model suggests it should be. Here, I have proposed
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the idea that complementarity between the possibility of indirect observation of opponents’
intentions and frequency of renewal are forces behind the apparently troubling general result.
Both ideas are used to reconcile predictions from bad reputation models and the existence
of markets with those features. It is also important that the results hold for arbitrarily long
finite horizon games.
2.8 Appendix: Proofs
Definitions. For each exit action e ∈ E, the probability distribution over public signals
satisfy these two conditions: ρ(y|a, e) = ρ(y|e) for all a ∈ A, y ∈ Y , and ρ(Y E|e) = 1. If
short-run player chooses any entry action b /∈ E, then ρ(Y E|a, b) = 0 for all a ∈ A. A set of
signals Y is evidence for a set of actions N if N is non-empty and ρ(y|n, b) > ρ(y|a, b) for
all b /∈ E, y ∈ Y , n ∈ N and a /∈ N . An action a is vulnerable to temptation relative to a
set of signals Y if there exist numbers ρ, ρ˜ > 0 and an action d such that (i) If b /∈ E, y ∈ Y ,
then ρ(y|d, b) ≥ ρ(y|a, b)− ρ; (ii) If b /∈ E and y /∈ Y ∪ Y E then ρ(y|d, b) ≥ (1 + ρ˜)ρ(y|a, b);
and (iii) For all b ∈ E, u1(d, b) ≥ u1(a, b). Define the effective discount factor δ˜ = (1 − ν)δ.
Let the constant κ be interpreted as a measure of how revealing the evidence is, and defined
by κ = minn∈N,a/∈N,β{E}<1,y∈Y
ρ(y|n,β)
ρ(y|a,β) . Note that κ is finite with κ > 1. Let ϕ > 0 be the
minimum of the temptation bounds ρ and finally the signal lag given by η = − log(γϕ)\ log κ.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. Let us define the minmax payoff u2 for short-run player 2 given by
u2 = minα∈Amaxb∈B u2(α, b), and let α
2 be the long-lived player’s strategy that minimizes
the short-run player in the stage-game. Pick the profile of code of conduct r ∈ R such that
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for all players i = 1, 2, ri ∈ R0 prescribes:
ri1(z1) :=

f ∗ for all z1 ∈ Z1 \ Z1,
α2 otherwise,
and ri2(z2) :=

β ∈ B(f ∗) for all z2 ∈ Z2 \ Z2,
e ∈ E otherwise.
With some abuse of notation, we denote by f ∗ the strategy for long-run player which pre-
scribes the play of friendly action f ∗ every period, similarly, for strategy α2. It remains to
show that this profile of codes of conduct r ∈ R constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the self-
referential game. Note that the long-run player gets an expected payoff of u1(f
∗, β) which is
the most he can get by playing his Stackelberg friendly action, any other action will cause
the short-run player to exit game so he does not have incentives to deviate from this code.
Similarly for short-run player, by adhering to this code he expects a friendly action to be
played and avoids being minmaxed by the long-lived player.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.1. For any positive probability public history ht ∈ H t, let µ(ht)[Θ0]
be the posterior beliefs over types Θ0 ⊆ Θ. For player 2 and any private signal z2 ∈
Z2, let µ(h
t, z2)[Θ(N)] be the posterior beliefs on unfriendly types after incorporating the
information of the self-referential game using Bayes’ rule, and let µ0(z2)[Θ0] be the posterior
beliefs for the null history h0. We write µ˜(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] for the posterior beliefs at the
beginning of period t+ 1 taking into account private signals and the probability of renewal
of the long-lived player, and its formal expression can be found below. We next construct
the profile of code of conduct r ∈ R with ri ∈ R0 for all players i such that for the long-run
player
ri1(z1) :=

f ∈ F for all z1 ∈ Z1 \ Z1,
a /∈ F otherwise.
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Same disclaimer about notation as in the previous proof applies here. For short-run players
we have
ri2(z2) :=

β ∈ B(f ∗) if µ˜(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] < 1− γ for all z2 ∈ Z2 \ Z2,
e ∈ E otherwise.
Suppose that all players i adhere to the proposed code of conduct ri ∈ R0. Consider any
positive probability history ht ∈ H t, and assume z2 ∈ Z2 \ Z2. Then the posterior beliefs
of short-run player on the unfriendly commitment types at the beginning of period t can be
written as
µ˜(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] = νµ0(z2)[Θ(N)] + (1− ν)µ(ht, z2)[Θ(N)]
The posterior beliefs is a linear combination of two components. The first component takes
into account the possibility of renewal of the long-run player. The second component com-
bines the information in the public history up to period t and the information in the private
signal. We define the constant Λ = (1 − λ)/(1 − (λ + η)) for natational convenience, and
note that Λ > 1 as η > 0. By Bayes’ rule we obtain
µ˜(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] =
ν(1− pi2(z2|r˜1, r−1))µ0[Θ(N)]
(1− pi2(z2|r˜1, r−1))µ0[Θ(N)] + (1− pi2(z2|r))(1− µ0[Θ(N)])
+
(1− ν)(1− pi2(z2|r˜1, r−1))µ(ht)[Θ(N)]
(1− pi2(z2|r˜1, r−1))µ(ht)[Θ(N)] + (1− pi2(z2|r))(1− µ(ht)[Θ(N)])
Observe that all unfriendly commitment types would be violating the code of conduct r.
Pick the history hˆT ∈ H where all signals yt ∈ hˆT belong to the set of bad signals Y . Since
the self-referential game has uniformly friendly commitment size 1− γ, χ for some constant
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χ > 0, and probability of replacement is ν the posterior beliefs then can be bounded by
µ˜(hˆT , z2)[Θ(N)] ≤ ν[1− (γ + χ)]
1− (γ + χ)(1− Λ) +
(1− ν)[1− ν(γ + χ)]
1− ν(γ + χ)(1− Λ)
By adhering to the code r, short-run players do not exit the game as long as the posterior
beliefs satisfy µ˜(hˆT , z2)[Θ(N)] < 1− γ. Using the last expression, this is equivalent to
−ν2(γ + χ)Λ + ν(γ + χ)b− γ(1− (γ + χ)(1− Λ)) > 0
where the constant b is given by b ≡ (γ+χ)[Λ− (γ+χ)(1−Λ)(Λ(1−γ) +γ) +γ+ Λ(1−γ)].
Thus, from the second-order polynomial we obtain
ν˜ =
−b−√b2 − 4Λγ(1− (γ + χ)(1− Λ))
−2(γ + χ)Λ
For all probabilities of renewal ν with ν ≥ ν˜ we have µ˜(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] < 1− γ for any history
ht ∈ H that guarantees short-run player would participate in the game. Observe that since
all short-run players draw the same signal about long-lived player’s intentions, his incentives
to follow the code are driven at a stage-game level. Suppose that all short-run player adhere
to the proposed code of conduct. Let M = maxi∈I ui and m = mini∈I ui be the highest
and lowest payoffs in the stage-game. If the normal long-run player adheres to the code of
conduct r he obtains at least
u1(f
∗, β) + (1− (1− λ)2)(u1(a, β)− u1(f ∗, β)− (M −m)) + pi2(z2|r)(u1(f ∗, e)− u1(f ∗, β))
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On the other hand, if he optimally deviates and chooses the code of conduct r˜1 in which he
plays some action a˜ ∈ A he gets at most
u1(a˜, β) + (1− (1− λ)2)(u1(a˜, β)− u1(a, β) +M −m)
+ (pi2(z2|r) + η)(u1(f ∗, e)− u1(f ∗, β) + u1(a, β)− u1(a˜, β))
Then the gain to deviation can be bounded above by
u1(a˜, β)− u1(f ∗, β) + (1− (1− λ)2)(u1(a˜, β)− 2u1(a, β) + u1(f ∗, β) + 2(M −m))
+ (pi2(z2|r) + η)(u1(f ∗, e)− u1(f ∗, β) + u1(a, β)− u1(a˜, β)) + pi2(z2|r)(u1(f ∗, β)− u1(f ∗, e))
≤ u1(a˜, β)− u1(f ∗, β) + 2λ(u1(a˜, β)− 2u1(a, β) + u1(f ∗, β) + 2(M −m)) + ηC1
where C1 = u1(f ∗, e) − u1(f ∗, β) + u1(a, β) − u1(a˜, β). Adherence to the code of conduct r
by the normal long-run player requires
η >
u1(a˜, β)− u1(f ∗, β) + 2λC2
C1
we have defined constant C2 = u1(a˜, β)− 2u1(a, β) + u1(f ∗, β) + 2(M −m). This shows that
the code of conduct r is a self-referential Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.2. If Θ = {θee, θet}, in Ely-Va¨lima¨ki example without self-referentiality
the prior probability of bad type is bounded above by µ∗ ≤ 2u/w+ u. Suppose now we look
at the self-referential game. For the case with Θ = {θ0, θee, θet}, the code of conduct profile r
states that the long-run player chooses et for c, unless he observes nc in which case he chooses
ee. In addition, player 2 may choose In if he receives the signal g and stays out Out if b is
realized. The prior probability of bad type required for having short-run player participating
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is given by µ∗(g) ≤ (1− p)2u/(w+ u− q(w− u)− p2u). It follows that µ∗(g) ≥ µ∗ as q ≥ p.
We need to find the parameterization for p and q so that this code of conduct constitutes a
Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.6.1. We begin with part (a) of the Proposition. Suppose that the
short-run players observe only signals z2 ∈ Z2 \ Z2. Recall that
µ(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] =
(1− pi2(z2|r˜1, r−1))µ(ht)[Θ(N)]
(1− pi2(z2|r˜1, r−1))µ(ht)[Θ(N)] + (1− pi2(z2|r))(1− µ(ht)[Θ(N)])
≥ 1
µ(ht)[Θ(N)] + Λ(1− µ(ht)[Θ(N)])µ(h
t)[Θ(N)]
Observe that µ(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] < µ(h
t)[Θ(N)] as Λ > 1. Suppose that for some  > 0,
µ(ht)[Θ(N)] = 1− γ +  and µ(ht−1)[Θ(N)] < 1− γ. Thus
µ(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] ≥ 1
1− γ + Λγ − (Λ− 1)µ(h
t)[Θ(N)]
Next, we borrow from Lemma 2 in [Ely et al.(2008)Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine] the following
lower bound on the posterior probability of unfriendly commitment types10
µ(ht)[Θ(N)] ≥
(
1
1− γ + γ
κ
)k
µ0[Θ(N)]
This shows that the lower bound for µ(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] is below the lower bound found in the
last expression (without self-referentiality) which implies that signals in Z2 \ Z2 allow for a
greater number of bad signals Y given the same history.
10To find the number k they use the argument in [Fudenberg and Levine(1989),
Fudenberg and Levine(1992)].
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Suppose short-lived players’ private signals z2 ∈ Z2. By similar arguments, it must be
the case that µ(ht, z2)[Θ(N)] > µ(h
t)[Θ(N)]. That is, for a given number of bad signals,
observation of private signals in Z2 pushes the posterior probability upward relatively more
to the case without code of conduct. Finally, note that the updating beliefs formula with
self-referential signals is characterized by the factor Υ ≡ 1/µ[Θ(N)] + Λ(1−µ([Θ(N)]), from
which we stress Υ→ 1 as µ→ 1.
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Chapter 3
Timing and Codes of Conduct
3.1 Introduction
In economic environments where agents have the ability to infer intentions, the time at
which intentions can be discovered may have a substantial impact on the set of outcomes
that can arise in equilibrium. When intentions can be inferred at the outset, a folk theorem
for finite horizon games holds; however, when intentions are discovered later on the timing
has different effects depending on environmental details. This paper identifies two classes of
games with diametrically opposite results regarding such timing. In finitely repeated games,
the folk theorem continues to hold even if players observe intentions in the last period of the
game. In exit games, on the other hand, there exists a unique equilibrium outcome.
Many important situations in economics have agents capable of recognizing intentions. For
example, in industrial espionage an entry firm would spy on the incumbent’s response to
market entries before expanding business to a new market (e.g., Airbus and Boeing de-
veloping the jumbo jet, [Caruana and Einav(2008)]). Likewise, in military conflicts armies
spend resources to anticipate the enemy’s battlefield plan (e.g., [Solan and Yariv(2004)] and
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[Matsui(1989)]). Another example is the Chairman of the Federal Reserve giving a public
speech about a policy to be implemented and consumers predicting its time consistency.
Recognition techniques are also present in online pricing strategies; by way of illustration,
click stream pricing displays a price for the product depending on consumers’ browsing his-
tory (e.g., [Peters(2013)]). Similarly when a security agency employs ex-ante verifications,
such as random audits on passengers or internal audits in firms, it is attempting to recognize
intentions. These situations are captured by self-referential games.
Standard models of intention recognition typically suppose that strategies can be revealed in
the pre-play phase. Yet, in practice, agents partially observe intentions during the game such
as Airbus forecasting Boeing’s reaction to entries in the big jet segment after developing the
A380 superjumbo. Likewise, in monetary policy consumers may adjust predictions about the
annual speech in the third quarter. In click stream pricing, for instance, the seller may price
a complimentary product based on consumer’s choice up to the checkout stage. In contrast
to all previous analyses, the model I propose extends self-referential games to address the
realistic feature that agents might infer others’ plans in the course of the interaction.
From the self-referential perspective, the ability to infer intentions is conceptually the result
of conforming to a rule of behavior that might be too costly to change so that individuals
are committed to this rule. In this context, lying is not fully costless (i.e. cheap talk,
[Crawford(2003)]) in the sense that agents must imitate others’ behavior to send the same
signals as them. Moreover, agents may imperfectly identify opponents’ rules of behavior
because past play is observable, allowing for understanding intentions at some stage of the
game. Alternatively, elements of strategies might exhibit themselves via communication or
involuntary gestures. Such a situation could be [Frank(1987)]’s example in which a sincere
individual may blush whenever he lies. Consequently, blushing can be interpreted as evidence
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of potential dishonest behavior. As mentioned, there are costs associated with mimicking
behavior, for instance, manipulating information or faking. In business, planning a feint
would be costly because concealing the true state of a product’s development might require
continued investing in dead-end products.
Building on [Block and Levine(2012)], I model the self-referential game as an extension of a
base game. The base game is a multistage game with observed actions in which players know
the actions chosen at all previous stages and may move simultaneously in each stage, whereby
strategies depend on public histories. Coupling with this game, the self-referential framework
endows players with an upfront private signal at some stage. Accordingly, an extended
strategy is defined by public and private histories. The self-referential game is played in two
stages. At the first stage, players simultaneously choose a code of conduct which commits
the player to an extended strategy, and specifies one for each of his opponents. Privately
observed signals are drawn from an exogenous probability distribution that is determined
by the code of conduct profile. This probability distribution is meant to capture both the
idea that intentions are imperfectly observable and that codes of conduct might recognize
one another. In the second stage, each agent employs the extended strategy according to his
code of conduct.
In this model, players choose strategies that are indirectly conditioned on other players’ as
extended strategies consider the private signal which in turn depends on all players’ choices—
this is the self-referential property. These conditional commitment devices typically lead to
the infinite-regress problem. Within this context, it means that a strategy depends on
other player’s strategy that is conditioned by the first strategy, and this inductive argument
continues ad infinitum. Although such circularities are overcome because players triangulate
this dependence through private signals, and the likelihood of these signals is determined
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by an exogenous probability distribution. As a matter of interpretation, codes of conduct
should be thought of as social norms, to the extent that they provide a well-defined notion
of agreement. Motivated by the vast evidence on reciprocal behavior, self-referential models
focus on information structures that allow players to distinguish whether there is agreement.
As in the benchmark used in the literature, suppose that agents infer intentions only in the
pre-play phase, thereby allowing them to punish any kind of intentions. It is shown that for
any subgame perfect equilibrium of an infinite horizon game, there exists a Nash equilibrium
of the self-referential truncation that coincides with such a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The key to construct equilibria is the probability of distinguishing whether rivals agree on
the code of conduct. One implication of this result is that as the horizon grows long, the
probability of detecting deviations approaches zero for any equilibrium strategy.
The main contribution of this paper is to identify two classes of games with starkly opposite
predictions depending on the time at which intentions can be discovered. To begin with, I
study finitely repeated games with discounting where the ability to observe intentions in the
last round of the game suffices to prove a version of the folk theorem. Its proof hinges on
patient players whose behavior is sensitive to changes in endpoint payoffs and on deviations
that are likely to be detected. Under some regularity assumptions findings suggest that
the sooner agents recognize intentions, the lower is the required probability of detecting
deviations from the code of conduct in equilibrium.
Exit games, by contrast, is a class of games in which the equilibrium outcome set is immune
to the possibility of inferring intentions later on. From this collection of games, I first consider
splitting games where every player is able to terminate the game in each period, and the
game also ends exogenously in the last round if none of them has exited. In this context, the
equilibrium set with outcomes where everyone exits in the first period is rendered unique
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by intentions that can be discovered after the first stage. This is because the stakes in
the beginning offset expected payoffs in any self-referential equilibrium exhibiting late exit
profiles. Nonetheless, exit is delayed arbitrarily when intentions are inferred at the outset.
Another subclass of exit games is preemption games, where just one player—that may be
active for many consecutive stages—can exit in each stage. When intentions are discovered
in the next to the last active period, I show that there is a unique equilibrium outcome where
the first mover exits immediately. The reason is that, although agents prefer to exit at late
stages, leaving in the first active period entails enough payoffs without being punished. Yet,
equilibria exhibiting delayed exit could be constructed as long as the player ending the game
glean a rival’s intentions one active period preceding exit, allowing him to punish deviations.
Thus, players find it optimal to end the game conditional on the targeted exit profile.
The model extends to allow for asynchronous intention recognition, that is, players receive
information about one another’s code of conduct at different stages. In finitely repeated
games, I find that a folk theorem applies since agents use signals in the last round of the game
that help coordinate punishments and rewards. On the other hand, in splitting games the
unique equilibrium outcome has all players exiting in the first period because sustaining exit
profiles after that requires initial-period signals for all players. Finally, in preemption games
there exists a unique equilibrium outcome under late signals; nevertheless, equilibria with
exit profiles at late stages can be sustained as players alternate active periods complementing
the asynchronous, but early, timing of signals.
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3.1.1 Related Literature
Self-referential games were introduced by [Levine and Pesendorfer(2007)] in the context of an
evolutionary model where players are pairwise matched to play a symmetric game. In their
setting imitation of strategies is more likely than innovation, and identification of behavior
prior to play is possible. They show that strategies that emerge in the long run are those that
reward opponents that are likely to play similarly and punish opponents that are likely to
behave differently. The self-referential framework was extended to multi-players asymmetric
games by defining codes of conduct in [Block and Levine(2012)], who prove a folk theorem
for repeated games with private monitoring. The key difference is that these models assume
that behavior recognition occurs in the beginning of the game, while here it also happens
during the game.
Codes of conduct have similar characteristics to conditional commitment devices. The self-
referential framework is closely related to that of [Tennenholtz(2004)] and [Kalai et al.(2010)Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet].11
In both papers, agents choose a commitment device that conditions on other players’ com-
mitment device. While they assume that these devices are perfectly observable, I analyze
behavior that is conditioned by noisy information; although I also consider underlying games
with complete information. See [Peters and Szentes(2012)] and [Forges(2013)] for the exten-
sion of [Kalai et al.(2010)Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet]’s model to Bayesian games, and
[Peters and Troncoso-Valverde(2013)] for a folk theorem in competing mechanism games in
which agents employ this kind of devices.
11[Tennenholtz(2004)] develop a setting where players submit programs which take as input the other
players’ program and play on their behalf. A program equilibrium is constructed by programs that give an
outcome action if they are syntactically identical and punish otherwise. Although, he did not describe the
set of programs. At a more general level, [Kalai et al.(2010)Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet] characterize
the conditional commitment devices space. In self-referential games, this space is assumed to be common
and very general.
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This paper contributes to the literature that studies the possibility of observing strategies
before the actual play of the game. For instance, [Matsui(1989)] considers two-player in-
finitely repeated games in which players may observe opponents’ metagame strategy with
small probability before the game starts, allowing revision of strategies. He shows that any
subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector is Pareto efficient. In contrast, in this paper infor-
mation about rivals’ code of conduct is imperfect and the class of games is much broader. In
two-player normal form games, [Solan and Yariv(2004)] examine espionage games where one
player can pay for a signal which delivers information about the other player’s strategy. The
main result says that the set of espionage equilibria coincides with the set of non-degenerate
semi-correlated equilibrium distributions. While the espionage game is sequential and has
only one-side spy, in my approach players simultaneously choose codes of conduct and receive
a private signal with no explicit cost.
More recently, [Kamada and Kandori(2011)] study revision games in which the opportunity
to revise actions arrive stochastically, and prepared actions are mutually observable and
implemented at a predetermined time. They find that the subgame perfect equilibrium set
widens, while [Calcagno et al.(2013)Calcagno, Kamada, Lovo, and Sugaya] show that revi-
sion games narrow down the set of equilibrium payoffs in common and opposing interest
games. In the present model, strategies are imperfectly observable via signals with deter-
ministic arrival time.
All these papers have information about strategies releasing at the outset, whereas I char-
acterize how the size of the equilibrium outcome set gets determined by the time at which
intentions are inferred.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I present the framework of
the base and the self-referential game, and the information technology. Section 3.3 studies
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self-referential games in which recognition occurs only in advance. In section 3.4, I analyze
finitely repeated games and characterize the equilibrium set in terms of the timing of signals.
In Section 3.5, I examine exit games showing the implications of the timing on equilibrium
behavior. Section 3.6 extends the analysis to asynchronous signals, contrasting asynchronic-
ity results in each class of games with the equilibrium predictions obtained in the original
setting. I conclude in Section 3.7. The Appendix collects the proofs.
3.2 The Model
I next outline the general framework. In section 3.2.1 I describe multistage games with
observed actions. Section 3.2.2 presents the self-referential game, extending the setting in
[Block and Levine(2012)] and allowing players to learn about opponents’ intentions in the
course of play.
3.2.1 Setup and Notation
I concentrate on multistage games with observed actions as defined in [Fudenberg and Tirole(1991)].12
There are a set of players I with cardinality |I| = N and T + 1 stages.13
Let h0 = ∅ be the initial public history and Ai(h0) 3 a0i be the finite actions set available
for player i at stage 0. The public history of play until stage t is defined recursively as a
12This class of games is also known as multistage games with almost perfect informa-
tion and perfect recall. Multistage games were generalized to multistage situations by
[Greenberg et al.(1996)Greenberg, Monderer, and Shitovitz]. Their framework applies to a broader
class of social environments and allows for analysis to cases where, for example, the strategies tuples are
not Cartesian product of the players’ strategy sets.
13For finite set X, let ∆(X) be the set of probability distributions on X. For list of sets X1, . . . , XN , I
write X := ×iXi with typical element x ∈ X, and X−i := ×j 6=iXj with element x−i.
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sequence of action profiles denoted by ht = (a0, a1, . . . , at−1) whose length is l(ht). Player i
chooses an action ati from his finite actions set Ai(h
t) at stage t with profile at ∈ A(ht), and
{a} stands for the no-decision action. I write H t for the set of all stage t public histories
and H :=
⋃∞
t=0 H
t for the set of all public histories. Let Z be the set of terminal histories
where hT+1 is finite if T <∞, otherwise it is infinite, h∞.
A (behavioral) strategy for player i is a map σi : H → ∆Ai(ht) where each ∆Ai(ht) is
endowed with the standard topology, and Sti := ∆Ai(ht) for notational convenience. Let
∆A(ht) be the space of independent strategy profiles equipped with the product topology.
The set Σi denotes pure strategies, and profiles are Σ with typical element σp. Write Ξi for
behavioral strategies with profile Ξ.
The reward function for player i is gi : H → R where he receives payoff gi(ht) following history
ht at stage t − 1 that is discounted to stage t − 2 by discount factor δi ∈ (0, 1]. Denote by
A∞ the set of possible outcomes with generic element a∞. Specifically, the outcome path
induced by σp is denoted by a
∞(σp). Player i’s payoffs as a function of pure strategy profile,
ui : Σ→ R, is
ui(σp) =
∞∑
t=0
δtigi(a
t(σp)).
I extend the domain of rewards to behavior strategies profile σ in the standard way denoting
them by ui(σ). Finally, let Γ stand for the multistage game with observed actions.
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3.2.2 The Self-Referential Game
In the self-referential game, the set of players is also I. Every player i observes a signal yi
only in the beginning of stage τi, that belongs to the finite set Yi with |Yi| ≥ 2.14 The stage
τi is deterministic and commonly known.
Let H ti be the set of all stage t private histories of player i with element h
t
i. It follows that
H ti = ∅ for all stages t < τi, and H ti ⊂ Yi for all stages t ≥ τi. Let Hi :=
⋃∞
t=0H
t
i denote the
set of all private histories, and if Y i ⊂ Yi then H ti ⊂ Y i is accordingly defined. An extended
strategy for player i is a map si from public and private histories to actions, si : H×Hi → Sti .
Let s ∈ S be a profile of extended strategies.15
The strategy of player i in the self-referential game, ri, is called a code of conduct which is
an |I|× 1 vector whose jth element corresponds to what player i assigns to player j’s choice
of extended strategies. Specifically, for any i and all j 6= i the code of conduct ri is a choice
of |I| number of extended strategies, rij : H × Hj → Stj . I also refer to codes of conduct
as self-referential strategies. Each player i is endowed with the common space of codes of
conduct R0 given by
R0 :=
{
ri | rij ∈ StjH×Hjand ∀i, j ∈ I,∀ht ∈ H,∀htj ∈ Hj, rij(ht, htj) ∈ Stj
}
,
where StjH×Hj is the set of functions with domain H ×Hj and range Stj . Note well that the
code of conduct ri commits player i to an extended strategy and players participate in the
14The signal yi parameterizes the information about intentions accumulated up to stage τi. The idea is
that players accrue pieces of information during the game, and at some point they make use of them to
evaluate adversaries’ intentions.
15To avoid measure theoretic considerations, I assume that the set of strategies for player i, Si is finite.
Observe that finite mixed strategies are permitted, for example, rolling a finite n-dimensional dice.
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self-referential game even if they pay no attention to signals.16 A code of conduct vector is
denoted by r ∈ R.
For each code of conduct profile r ∈ R, let pi(·|r) be the probability distribution over signal
profiles Y . I define the intention monitoring structure as the collection of probability distri-
butions over private signal profiles {pi(·|r) ∈ ∆(Y ) : r ∈ R}. For each r, pii(·|r) denotes the
marginal distribution of pi(·|r) over Yi, that is, the probability that player i receives signal
yi under the code of conduct profile r. We say an intention monitoring structure (Y, pi) is
stage-t timing if signal profile y ∈ Y is observed in the beginning of stage t, i.e. τi = t for
all i.
Player i’s expected payoffs in the self-referential game Ui : R→ R are
Ui(r) =
∑
y∈Y
ui(r
1
1(h, h1(y1)), . . . , r
N
N (h, hN(yN)))pi(y|r).
Let G(Γ) = {Γ, Y, pi, R} represent the self-referential game. A vector of codes of conduct r∗
is a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential game (or self-referential equilibrium) if for all
players i ∈ I and codes of conduct ri ∈ R0, Ui(r∗) ≥ Ui(ri, r∗−i).
The self-referential game G takes place in two stages. It starts with players choosing simul-
taneously code of conduct, ri ∈ R0. Then each player i chooses rii(ht, hti) ∈ Sti for histories
ht ∈ H, hti ∈ Hi, and observes private signal yi ∈ Yi in the beginning of stage τi.
Finally, the detection technology allows players to discern whether rivals adhere to the same
code of conduct (as in [Block and Levine(2012)]) and it plays an important role in developing
the results in this paper. Specifically, we say that the self-referential game η-λ permits
16[Kalai et al.(2010)Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet] and [Forges(2013)] define voluntary commitment de-
vices so they allow the possibility of “not committing,” while here players are committed to codes of conduct.
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detection if for two constants η, λ ∈ [0, 1], for all players i there exist some player j 6= i and a
subset of private signals Y j ⊂ Yj such that for all code of conduct profiles r ∈ R, any signal
yj ∈ Y j and each code of conduct r˜i 6= ri, it follows that pij(yj|r˜i, r−i) − pij(yj|r) ≥ η and
pij(yj|r) ≤ λ.
In words, the lower bound η describes the minimum probability of detecting deviations from
some code of conduct profile r, associating such deviations to signals in the set Y i. Although,
players also observe this type of signals even if everyone follows the profile r leading us to
interpret constant λ as the upper bound of the false positive probability. This technology
suggests that agents use simplified categorization of intentions, aiming a specific behavior
while bundling all deviations into a single class.17 Note also that it gives the identity of the
deviator but not the magnitude of the deviation.
3.3 Pre-Game Signals
In this section, I establish a connection between the equilibrium set in the infinite-horizon
game and the set of self-referential equilibria in the finite-horizon version of the game. More
precisely, I show that the set of outcomes that may arise in self-referential equilibrium of the
finite horizon approximation of the infinite horizon game is equal to the set of equilibrium in
the original game as long as players observe signals in the pre-play phase. A classic example
is the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with patient enough players. Going from
the plethora of equilibria in the infinite horizon game to the unique equilibrium of the finitely
repeated game produces a discontinuity.
17One interpretation is that codes of conduct might be so complex that agents bundle intentions of oppo-
nents’ behavior into analogy classes. These simplifications resembles [Jehiel(2005)]’s analogy-based expec-
tation equilibrium in which players partition histories into analogy classes and best-respond to beliefs that
opponents’ behavior is constant within each analogy class.
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Let Γ∞ be an infinite horizon multistage game with observed actions described in Section
3.2. Consider any finite stage τ, let Γτ represent the same game with time horizon truncated
at τ. To approximate this game with its finite truncation we require players to be passive
after stage τ by choosing the no-decision action a thereafter.18 Of particular interest are
games in which future payoffs are not relevant. Formally, an infinite horizon game Γ∞ is
said to be continuous at infinity ([Fudenberg and Levine(1983)]) if for any ε > 0 there exists
some k <∞ such that
|ui(σ)− ui(σˆ)| < ε if σk = σˆk for all i ∈ I and all σ, σˆ ∈ Ξ.
Examples of such games are repeated games with discounting and any finite horizon game.
The set of games that fails continuity at infinity includes, for instance, repeated games with
limit-average payoffs and alternating-offer bargaining games with no discounting.
The result of this section holds for all multistage games with observed actions that are
continuous at infinity, and it says that we can reconstruct any subgame perfect equilibrium
of the infinite horizon game in its self-referential finite truncation if players are likely to
detect disagreement on codes of conduct in the beginning of the game.
Theorem 3.3.1. For |I| = 2. Let Γ∞ be continuous at infinity. Suppose that the self-
referential game satisfies η-λ permit detection with λ = 0, and τi = 0 for all i. For any
subgame perfect equilibrium σˆ in Γ∞ and τ-truncation Γτ, there exist a probability of detection
ητ > 0 and a profile of codes of conduct r
τ such that for all η ∈ [ητ, 1] in the self-referential
equilibrium rii = σˆi,τ for all hi /∈ H i, i ∈ I. Moreover, the probability of detection ητ → 0 as
τ→∞.
18Apply the truncation of length k on σ to obtain the partial strategy σk for some k ∈ Z from σ ∈ Ξ.
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See Appendix 3.8.1 for the proof.
The literature on the connection between infinite and finite horizon games has focused on
perfect ε equilibria of the finite truncation Γτ.19 In contrast, Theorem 3.3.1 presents a
relationship between the perfect equilibrium set of Γ∞ and the exact equilibria of the self-
referential game built on the truncation of the original game G(Γτ). We may interpret
Theorem 3.3.1 as a lower hemi-continuity result, that is, exact equilibria of the self-referential
game approach the limit point. A result of [Fudenberg and Levine(1983), Theorem 3.3]
guarantees that a subgame-perfect equilibrium in finite-action game exists.
Agents can only distinguish imperfectly whether opponents choose the same self-referential
strategy because of η, λ detection technology. Consequently, a natural construction of self-
referential equilibria uses grim trigger strategies, whereby each player rewards others unless
he observes deviations from the code of conduct. The equilibrium code of conduct takes a
simple form: in the case of evidence of agreement, agents play the truncated strategy σˆτ,
while if signals indicate deviations from the code of conduct then players minmax opponents
forever. On the equilibrium path players do not punish others following the code of conduct
whenever λ = 0, but they do so to deviators. In fact, deviators are unlikely to be punished
when the chance of detection is low. Therefore, there is a threshold level of detection ητ
below which the expected profit from deviation is high relative to the cost of punishment.
When detection probability is above ητ, the cost of punishment dominates and players adhere
to this code of conduct.
19See, for instance, [Radner(1981)], [Fudenberg and Levine(1986)], [Harris(1985a), Harris(1985b)] and
[Bo¨rgers(1989), Bo¨rgers(1991)]. A profile of strategies σˆ is an ε Nash equilibrium if ∀i, σi, ε ≥ 0,
ui(σˆ) ≥ ui(σi, σˆ−i)−ε. A strategy σˆ is a perfect ε-equilibrium if ∀i, h, σi, ui(σˆh) ≥ ui(σhi , σˆh−i)−ε. The latter
was defined as ex ante perfect ε equilibrium by [Mailath et al.(2005)Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson].
They consider contemporaneous perfect ε equilibrium that evaluates best responses at the time of the devi-
ation. For finite games and small epsilon, these two notions of equilibria coincide.
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The requirement of a detection probability ητ > 0 is weak because ητ becomes arbitrarily
small as τ → ∞. Consider the equilibrium code of conduct profile rτ constructed above
for a fixed truncation τ, and take a longer horizon. The difference between the gain to
deviation and to adherence determines the critical detection probability ητ. In the long run,
this difference shrinks as the approximation improves (τ→∞) due to continuity at infinity.
Note that the hypothesis of the theorem cannot be strengthen to ητ = 0, namely players
always detect disagreement about codes of conduct.20
3.4 Finitely Repeated Games
As mentioned, the effect of the timing of signals depends strongly on the underlying game.
It is instructive then to do the analysis within specific classes of games, indeed I consider
two starkly opposite ones respecting the effect of the timing on the equilibrium outcome set.
In this section, I study finitely repeated games with discounting where a folk theorem-like
for one-shot games holds, getting approximately any feasible and individually rational payoff
vector. In addition, I show a few different versions of a folk theorem for discounted repeated
games even if intentions are observable in the last round of the game.
3.4.1 The Stage Game
Let Γ be the stage game. Each player i ∈ I has a finite actions set Ai with |Ai| ≥ 2, and the
profile of actions is a ∈ A. Reward functions are gi : A → R. I write αi for mixed actions
for each player i with αi ∈ ∆(Ai), and I extend payoffs to mixed strategies in the standard
20The interpretation that the probability of detection goes to zero (η → 0) is that signals become decreas-
ingly informative about deviations from a profile r, as long as λ = 0.
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manner Eα(gi(a)) = gi(α). For each player i, I denote by vi the (mixed strategies) minmax
payoff of player i in the stage game as
vi := min
α−i∈∆(A−i)
max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai, α−i).
Then take action α−i ∈ ∆(A−i) such that
vi := max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai, α−i),
where α−i is the action profile that gives the minmax payoff to player i. Let
U := {(v1, . . . , vN) : ∃a ∈ A, ∀i, gi(a) = vi} ,
V := co(U),
V ∗ := int ({(v1, . . . , vN) ∈ V : ∀i ∈ I, vi > vi}) .
V is the set of feasible payoff vectors and V ∗ is the set of feasible and strictly individually
rational payoff vectors.21 Players have access to a public randomization device which gen-
erates a public signal ωt ∈ [0, 1] uniformly distributed and independent across periods at
the start of each period t, i.e. (ωt)t∈N is an i.i.d. sequence. Thus, they may condition their
actions on these signals.
The next result states that the set of self-referential equilibria payoffs approximately coincides
with the set of feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs of the one-shot game Γ, if
some conditions on the self-referential information structure are satisfied.
21co denotes the convex-hull operator and int(X) stands for the topological interior of a set X.
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Theorem 3.4.1. Let |I| = 2. Assume that the self-referential game η-λ permits detection
with τi = 0 for all i. For every feasible and strictly individually rational payoff vector v ∈ V ∗
in the stage game Γ, there exist η0 > 0 and λ0 such that for all η ≥ η0, λ ≤ λ0 there is a
self-referential equilibrium profile r where player i’s expected payoff is approximately vi for
each i.
The proof may be found in Appendix 3.8.2 along with the rest of the proofs corresponding
to the results in this section.22
This is an approximate one-shot folk theorem due to the noisiness of signals. In particular,
to establish a self-referential equilibrium with expected payoffs v, I show that we can only get
close to v, but not arbitrarily close, when there are on-equilibrium punishments (λ > 0), and
we must find a critical (small enough) λ0 for supporting this equilibrium. It follows that the
lower the λ, the closer are expected payoffs to v. Moreover, the threshold η0 is determined
by the condition that a player must not gain from deviating by choosing an alternative
code of conduct. These two thresholds reflect a trade-off for players between the benefit
from adhering to the code of conduct and thus the potential cost of either punishing some
innocent opponent or being punished, and the benefit from deviating, thereby obtaining the
immediate payoff and avoiding carrying out the punishment.
By having players submitting programs, [Tennenholtz(2004)] shows a similar result; however,
programs use independent mixed strategies of the stage game Γ so it falls short of efficiency
payoffs in some cases. A complete folk theorem is proved by [Kalai et al.(2010)Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet].
In their setting, players observe the choice of conditional commitment devices and use jointly
22This result is the extension of [Block and Levine(2012), Theorem 5.1] to imperfect identification of codes
of conduct, and it is the non-evolutionary asymmetric version of [Levine and Pesendorfer(2007)]’s result.
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controlled lotteries (a la [Aumann and Maschler(1995)]) to overcome the necessity of random-
izing over feasible payoffs. Different from that paper, here agents can choose mixed strategies
and use the public correlation device allowing us to dispense of controlled lotteries to obtain
efficient payoffs. Unlike the complete folk theorem of [Kalai et al.(2010)Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet],
Theorem 3.4.1 is approximate since recognition is correct only probabilistically on the equi-
librium path.
3.4.2 The Repeated Game
This subsection focuses on N -player discounted, finitely repeated games with perfect moni-
toring. Stages are referred to as periods. The finitely repeated game ΓT is the T -fold repe-
tition of the stage game Γ. In each period t players simultaneously choose actions ai ∈ Ai,
and after period T the game ends. Let At := A0× . . .×At−1 be the t-fold Cartesian product
of A, and by perfect monitoring the set of t-length public histories is H t = At. A behavior
strategy for player i is a map σi : H → ∆(Ai). I omit public signals ω on the description
of public history for conciseness.23 Players discount future with common discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1). Given any strategy profile σp ∈ Σ, a path of play is induced (at)t≤T . Thus, the
normalized payoffs for player i, ui : Σ→ R can be written as
ui(σp) =
1− δ
1− δT+1
T∑
t=0
δtgi(a
t(σp)).
Finitely repeated games exhibit the so-called unraveling property—that is, players have in-
centive to choose a profitable action in the last period so any strategy other than repetition
of a static Nash equilibrium unravels from the end to the beginning of the game. Roughly
23In this case public history at period t would be ht = (a0, . . . , at−1, ω0, . . . , ωt) and strategies would be
measurable functions with respect to both past actions and the random variable ω.
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speaking, since the game ends after the final stage there is no room for retaliation. Within
this class, agents’ play is sensitive to the endpoint of the game. This leads us to conclude
that last-period signals might be sufficient for the self-referential equilibrium set to span
above the strictly individually rational payoff.
Next, I will show the main result of this section: A self-referential folk theorem for finitely
repeated games with discounting.
Theorem 3.4.2. For |I| = 2. Consider a self-referential game that η-λ permits detection
such that for any t ≤ T , τi = t for all i. For all v ∈ V ∗ and for any T -fold repetition of the
stage game ΓT , there exist a discount factor δ < 1 and parameters ητ > 0 and λτ such that
for each δ ∈ (δ, 1), η ∈ [ητ , 1] and λ ∈ [0, λτ ] there is a self-referential equilibrium profile of
codes of conduct rT so that player i’s expected payoff is approximately vi for all i.
This theorem places no restrictions on the timing of signals. In other words, to construct
a self-referential equilibrium that sustains approximately any v ∈ V ∗ players may receive
information about opponents’ code of conduct in any period of the game, even in period T .
The reason why this result is indifferent to the timing can be seen from the proof. Below, I
outline a sketch of the argument.
The first step is to find a threshold δ, above which players find profitable deviations in the last
round of the game for the case without self-referentiality. Then, consider a code of conduct
such that grim-trigger strategies are used. Since there are on-equilibrium punishments (λ >
0), players would punish last-period deviations in period T , ensuring the lowest possible costs
when these are triggered. Given these incentives, when signals arrive before the final stage
players cannot infer opponents’ realisation because this information will be used at the end.
Next, the equilibrium code of conduct pins down the cutoffs ητ and λτ that are determined
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by last-period behavior. This equilibrium code of conduct reinforces the fact that players’
behavior is sensitive to payoff perturbations in the endpoint, thereby forgoing the unraveling
logic discussed above.
Two features are worth noting in contrast to existing folk theorems for finitely repeated
games. First, this result holds for any finite time horizon T and we do not need to find
a sufficiently high threshold T ∗. Second, it does not require multiple Nash equilibria of
the stage game Γ to construct reward and punishment phases. These two conditions are
necessary for the proof, for example, in [Benoˆıt and Krishna(1985)] and [Friedman(1985)].24
Unlike these papers, the equilibrium payoff vector cannot be arbitrarily close to v ∈ V ∗, in
fact, it hinges on the equilibrium thresholds ητ and λτ .
The next corollary to Theorem 3.4.2 computes the approximation to payoff vector v ∈ V ∗
in the self-referential game.
Corollary 1. Consider the self-referential equilibrium code of conduct profile rT in Theorem
3.4.2. All players i have expected payoffs given by
Ui(r
T ) = vi − (1− δ)δ
T
1− δT+1 C := vi − ε(δ,T )C,
where the constant C depends on the stage-game payoffs and the parameter λ.
In words, the self-referential equilibrium payoff Ui(r
T ) is a perturbation of the targeted
payoff vi. This perturbation depends not only on the time horizon of the game T and
level of patience δ, but also on rewards and punishments in the last round of the game
captured by C. The first component is on the equilibrium punishments (λ ≥ 0). When
24For the extension to mixed strategies, [Gossner(1995)] uses sufficiently long horizon to build reward
schemes. See also [Smith(1995)], [Neyman(1999)], and [Miyahara and Sekiguchi(2013)].
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these punishments are rare, λ is small, the expected payoff is close to vi. The intuition is
that adherence to code of conduct is “visible” among players which implies that the agent is
unlikely to be punished if he follows rT . Observe that agents dish out a relatively less costly
on the equilibrium punishment whenever deviations are punished at the end of the game.
The second component is ε(δ,T ). For fixed discount factor δ, as we take longer horizon of the
finite game, the expected payoffs get closer to vi, i.e. as T → ∞, it follows that ε(δ,T ) → 0
and Ui → vi. Despite the improvement on the approximation to payoff vector v ∈ V ∗, the
probability of detection η does not approach zero (η 6→ 0) in the asymptotic limit of the
time horizon T →∞.
The result extends to time average payoffs. One interpretation is that it is continuous in the
discount factor δ, that is, as δ → 1 the equilibrium payoff vector in G(Γ) remains close to
V ∗.
The result in Section 3.3 suggests that we may require a lower probability of detection if
players acquire information in early periods of the game. To be consistent with Theorem
3.3.1, let us assume that λ = 0.25 Indeed, I will show that any v ∈ V ∗ is attainable in the
self-referential game if private signals are observed earlier than the last round of the game,
and that the threshold on probability of detection is smaller than the one found in Theorem
3.4.2.
Proposition 3.4.1. Let |I| = 2. Suppose the self-referential game η-λ permits detection
such that for all i, τi = T − k where k ∈ N, k > 1 and λ = 0. For any v ∈ V ∗ and any ΓT ,
there exist δ < 1 and ηT−k > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1), η ∈ [ηT−k, 1] every player i can
obtain vi in the self-referential equilibrium r˘
T , and ηT−k ≤ ηT .
25Within this class of games it is easy to see that when punishments are triggered on the equilibrium path
and close to the beginning of the game, the actual punishment for deviating from the code of conduct is still
severe.
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The detection probability threshold ηT−k is relaxed relative to the threshold ηT found in
Theorem 3.4.2 because players punish deviators in early periods without doing so on the
equilibrium path. In the self-referential equilibrium, players adhere to a code of conduct
profile r˘T that prescribes the minmaxing strategy in period T − k whenever signals point to
deviations, making punishments to such deviation more severe. Observe that threshold ηT−k
is independent of the time horizon T . As long as private signals arrive k periods before the
final round T , it is possible to construct these equilibria.
One might be interested in how early signals affect the approximation to payoffs in V ∗. The
actual computation of approximated payoff vector to v is presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let r˘T be the self-referential equilibrium profile from Proposition 3.4.1. The
approximate expected payoff of each player i is given by
Ui(r˘
T ) ≈ vi − (1− δ)δ
T−k
1− δT+1 C := vi − ε
′
δ,T−kC.
This is a corollary to Proposition 3.4.1. The reason why the constant C adds to the per-
turbation of the expected payoffs is the same as in Corollary 1. Regarding the component
ε′(δ,T−k) observe that for a fixed time horizon T the sooner punishments are triggered, the
larger would be the perturbation of expected payoffs. However, holding period k fixed, in
the limit, as T →∞ the perturbation vanishes as in Theorem 3.4.2.
The findings of Theorem 3.3.1 and Proposition 3.4.1 can be combined to compute the speed
of convergence of ηT . Recall that Theorem 3.3.1 says that ηT → 0 as T → ∞, thus, when
signals arrive in the beginning of the game, the critical value of the detection probability
under the equilibrium code of conduct profile converges to zero as the length of the truncation
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grows sufficiently large. Consequently I use the expression for ηT found in Proposition 3.4.1
and the corollary below follows this proposition.26
Corollary 3. Consider stage-0 timing intention monitoring structure τi = 0 , the probability
of detection ηT > 0 converges to zero at rate δ as T →∞. That is, ηT is O(δT ).
Proof. By Proposition 3.4.1, we restrict attention to the highest probability of detection
ηT > 0 which is
max
i∈I
ηi,T =
δT (gi(ai, a
∗
j)− gi(a∗))
gi(αj, αi)− gi(ai, αi) + δT (gi(ai, a∗j)− gi(a∗))
.
For fixed δ > δ, this goes to 0 at rate δ as T →∞.
In summary the earlier players can detect deviations, the smaller the required probability
of detection η that sustains the self-referential equilibrium but the more perturbed these
payoffs would be.
3.5 Exit Games
Going further in the analysis of the signal timing, I explore a second class of games that
represent situations where signals at the outset make a world of difference to the equilibrium
outcome set but are redundant at later stages. In this section, I examine exit games.27 The
main feature of these games is that some player i can terminate the game at any stage t.
After presenting a general framework, findings are developed by focusing on two subclasses:
splitting and preemption games.
26If we consider average payoffs, ηT is O(T
−1).
27These games are similar to simple timing games, see [Fudenberg and Tirole(1991), Section 4.5].
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As shown in the previous section, signals have a considerable impact on equilibrium outcomes
in finitely repeated games, regardless of the stage at which they arrive. In splitting games,
on the other hand, equilibrium behavior is affected only if there are initial-period signals.
More precisely, I show that there exists a unique equilibrium outcome when players cannot
recognize an opponent’s intentions in the beginning of the game, whereas if the recognition
technology is available from the start of the game, we can arbitrarily delay when the game
ends.
Preemption games lie between these two classes of games. Similarly as for finitely repeated
games, results suggest that the set of equilibrium outcomes will be increased even though
the intention monitoring happens relatively late in the game. As is the case for splitting
games, the self-referential equilibrium that induces exit at early stages requires recognition
possibilities ahead of these stages.
The General Framework
In the general environment, there is a set of players I := {1, . . . , N}, and these players are
involved for finitely T stages. Recall that public histories are defined recursively because
players observe all previous interactions. Each player i accesses a finite actions set which
is a bipartition, i.e. Ai(h
t) := {Fi(ht) ∪ Ei(ht)} for all ht ∈ H, i ∈ I. The subset Fi(ht)
represents the set of forward actions while not guaranteeing that the game continues are
necessary for moving to the next stage. The other component, Ei(ht), represents the set
of exit actions; in contrast to forward actions, these actions are sufficient to end the game.
Put differently, the game ends if there is only one player choosing exit actions. To lighten
notation, let Fi(ht) = F ti and Ei(ht) = E ti . By definition, the sets of forward and exit actions
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are disjoint, i.e. E ti ∩F ti = ∅. Idle players are allowed, that is, we may posit a player chooses
action a.
Whenever all active player i’s choose forward actions at stage t, f ti ∈ F ti , the game continues
to the next stage t + 1. Formally for any history ht and any player i, Ai(h
t) 6= ∅ if akj /∈ Ekj
for all k ≤ t− 1 and all active players j. On the other hand, if any active player i plays an
exit action eti ∈ E ti for any ht ∈ H, it causes the game to end regardless of the actions played
by all the other players j.
The last common feature is related to reward mappings, i’s payoff functions gi : H → R.
Until the game ends, each player receive no payoffs. Formally, gi(h
t) = 0 for all histories
ht ∈ H such that aki /∈ Eki for all i ∈ I, k ≤ t− 1. In addition, once the game ends no further
rewards are received. That is, if some player j chooses etj at stage t, then gi(h
k) = 0 for all
k > t, any ht and all players i. If all players continue until and including the last stage T ,
the game ends and the players’ payoffs are zero. This is just a normalization, but all results
are unchanged without it.
3.5.1 Splitting Games
The previous section established the general framework of exit games, including the structure
of payoffs and the actions set. This subsection studies the first subclass of exit games which
are defined as splitting games. These games capture situations in which agents take their
surplus share that are conditioned on others, and they pay a positive cost to divide the surplus
whenever other agents decide to take their portions. Henceforth, players have incentives to
anticipate their rivals because this guarantees the surplus share without incurring the cost.
Alternative, it could be interpreted as a partnership with exit (e.g., [Chassang(2010)]).
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In this setup, stages are referred to as time periods. Players discount future payoffs using the
constant discount factor δi ∈ (0, 1) and none of them are idle. Reward functions gi : H → R
for all players i are additively separable in surplus share and costs. These are represented
by
gi(a
t) = wi(a
t)− ci(at), ∀at ∈ A(ht),
where the benefit function wi(a
t) ≥ 0 has present value at any period t whereas the cost
function ci(a
t) ≥ 0 has period-t value. Players receive a share of this surplus wi(at) depending
on his action and on opponents’. Similarly, each player incurs a cost of ci(a
t) by taking his
share.
In particular, these preferences are characterized by the next set of assumptions. For all
i ∈ I, ht ∈ H, f ti ∈ F ti , f t−i ∈ F t−i, eti ∈ E ti , and et−i ∈ E t−i we have:
S.1 wi(e
t
i, ·) = wi > 0 with constant wi, and wi(f ti , ·) = 0;
S.2 ci(e
t
i, e
t
−i) = ci > 0 where ci is constant, otherwise ci(·) = 0.
In words, condition S.1 ensures that players would prefer to exit the game before his oppo-
nents rather than play a forward action. The constant wi should be thought of as a steady
state surplus. Condition S.2 in turn establishes that if all players decide to exit the game
simultaneously in period t, they will pay a cost equal to the constant cost ci discounted by
δi their time preference parameter, that is, δ
t
ici. For each of the complement action profiles
players pay nothing, ci = 0. Think of the constant ci as the cost of reaching agreement,
deciding and proposing a voting rule to share the surplus, or as a one-time version of the
transaction cost considered by [Anderlini and Felli(2001)]. Together assumptions S.1 and
S.2 imply that terminating the game late is a cooperative action.
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The next theorem should be interpreted as an impossibility result. It says that if players
comprehend cues about opponents’ code of conduct in any period but period t = 0, there is,
in fact, one self-referential equilibrium outcome in which every player immediately exits.
Theorem 3.5.1. Consider |I| = 2 and any splitting game Γ. Suppose that the self-referential
game η-λ permits detection with τi ≥ 1 for any i. Then for any η, λ there exists a unique self-
referential equilibrium outcome in which all profiles of codes of conduct rT have all players i
choosing rii(h
0, h0i ) = e
0
i for some exit action e
0
i ∈ E0i and all h0i ∈ Hi.
The proof is included in Appendix 3.8.3.28
The first point to make is that η-λ detection, players’ ability to understand their adversaries’
choice of strategies is irrelevant to this result. The driving force is precisely the timing of
intention monitoring structure τi.
Here is a rough outline of the proof. Under assumption S.1 that players obtain their surplus
fraction only if they choose an exit action, in any self-referential equilibrium they must
simultaneously terminate the game. Consider now a profile of codes of conduct r′ that
prescribes exit in some period t′ > 0. Against such profile, any player may choose an
alternative code of conduct unilaterally exiting in period 0, thereby taking wi without paying
ci, this is the optimal deviation because adherence to r
′ approximately gives an expected
payoff of wi − δt′ci. Such deviation is undetectable since information about intentions is
acquired later than the initial period. Moreover, when the deviator exits, terminating the
game, opponents cannot punish such behavior by drawing on public history. This argument
also applies to any period t > 0. Thus, I have shown that the self-referential game has a
28The reader may also find all the proofs of the results in this section in Appendix 3.8.3.
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unique equilibrium in which the players exit in the first period and hence delayed exit is
never reached.
This result leads us to conclude that signals are useless when either the game ends or signals
arrive late. Late, in this sense, is relative to the point at which players wish to deviate
from the code of conduct r. This important, but previously neglected, feature arises in
self-referential games with different timing of informative signals.
As codes of conduct represent social norms, one would expect to see players agree upon
exiting in periods t > 0. In fact, choosing an exit profile in the next period f t+1 Pareto
dominates doing it in the current period f t. A natural question is then, under what conditions
agents will make these kinds of agreement? The following anti-impossibility theorem answers
this question positively.
Theorem 3.5.2. Let |I| = 2 and Γ be a splitting game. Suppose the self-referential game
η-λ permits detection with τi = 0 for all i and any period k ≤ T . Then there are ηk > 0 and
λk such that for each η ∈ [ηk, 1], λ ∈ [0, λk] there exists a self-referential equilibrium rk in
which all players i exit the game in period k, rii(h
k, hki ) = e
k
i for all e
k
i ∈ Eki , hki 6∈ H i.
As with the intention monitoring structure τi > 0, there is a self-referential equilibrium with
immediate exit. However, contrary to Theorem 3.5.1, every exit profile can take place with
a delay of an arbitrary number of periods. It corresponds to the fact that agents’ ability
to detect intentions of deviation occurs sufficiently in advance, thereby allowing players to
punish deviations discussed above.
To see the intuition behind this result, recall that any r with exit in t ≥ 1 must have the
players simultaneously terminating the game in order to be a self-referential equilibrium. As
a result, the optimal deviation against this code for any player i is to choose e0i ∈ E0. When
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the possibility of detection happens in any period t > 0, these equilibria are unsustainable.
If signals are observed in the first period τi = 0, however, players may receive informative
signals pointing to these kind of deviations. Turning to the construction of the self-referential
equilibrium, consider a code of conduct rk in which players agree to exit in period k. Then, it
uses grim-trigger strategies in which a player chooses forward actions unless there is evidence
of exit in any period t ≤ k. Again as before, given the exit profile ek ∈ Ek, the parameters
ηk and λk are chosen so as to provide each player with the right incentives to adhere to the
code of conduct rk.
One key observation is that the requirement that players receive signals at the outset τi = 0
is independent of the particular exit profile ek that is aimed to be sustained in rk. The reason
why this holds is that each player finds it optimal to exit in any period preceding period k,
but then the reasoning works backwardly until the first period. Therefore, the deviation is
characterized by exiting in the beginning regardless of period k. In addition, by inspecting
the proof one may observe that the probability required for the equilibrium code of conduct
decreases with the exit profiles sustained in late periods.
To conclude this subsection, I analyze welfare with respect to the results we have shown so
far. Consider a parameterization of the information structure (Y, pi) with τi = 0 for each i
and bounds η, λ such that at least one exit profile et in each period t is implementable by
some code of conduct profile r ∈ R. Furthermore, the reward mappings gi(et) = wi−δtci are
monotonically increasing in period t ≥ 0 for all exit profiles et ∈ E t since the discounted cost
function δtci is decreasing in t ≥ 0 and the benefits function wi remains constant as it has
period-0 value. Even though there are multiple self-referential equilibria, by monotonicity
it is possible to have them Pareto-ranked: period-t exit profiles et are Pareto dominated by
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period-(t + 1) exit profiles et+1 for any period t. This allows me to compute how much is
lost if signals come late in the game, i.e. τi > 0 for all i.
Players discovering adversaries’ intentions after the game starts have a negative welfare effect;
indeed, such agents obtain the lowest Pareto-ranked payoff. On the other hand, when the
intention monitoring structure (Y, pi) is such that players observe signals in the beginning, i.e.
τi = 0, there exist self-referential equilibria where the equilibrium expected payoff vector is
greater than the lower bound of Pareto-ranked payoffs whenever τi ≥ 1. The next proposition
summarises the welfare implications of the results about the timing of signals in splitting
games.
Proposition 3.5.1. Suppose that Γ is a splitting game.
(i) If the intention monitoring structure (Y, pi) allows τi = t for any t ≥ 1 and all i, then
the unique outcome of any self-referential equilibrium gives the worst Pareto-ranked
payoff vector;
(ii) If the intention monitoring structure (Y, pi) satisfies τi = 0 for each i, then for any
period k ≤ T , η ≥ ηk and λ ≤ λk, there exists a self-referential equilibrium with payoff
vector greater than the worst Pareto-ranked payoff vector.
3.5.2 Preemption Games
The analysis of the previous sections suggest that at one extreme, in finitely repeated games
with discounting, the timing of signals is irrelevant to construct self-referential equilibria,
obtaining a few versions of the folk theorem. At the other extreme, in splitting games, I find
that informative signals must arrive at the outset to have some impact on the equilibrium
85
outcomes set of the self-referential game. Identifying a class of games that fits between these
two, perhaps, is of particular interest to better understand the timing of signals. In this
subsection, I examine preemption games. This class captures situations in which players
alternate veto power to terminate the game. For example, the two most influential parties
in the Congress, or a wage-bargaining between a company and a labor union, both may
alternate such veto power. Furthermore, it includes the well-studied centipede game.
The preemption game is typically modeled as follows, it runs from stage t = 0 to the odd
finite stage T . There is a set of two players and each player i does not discount between
stages, i.e. δi = 1. At each stage t, there is only one player i active. The game starts with
player 1 moving and ends with player 2 choosing an action.
Let ι : H \Z → I be the player function. This function assigns to each nonterminal history
h ∈ H \ Z a player i. I write ι(ht) = i for the case in which player i makes a choice from
Ai(h
t) after history ht in stage t. To make the analysis interesting, there must be a minimum
level of alternation between players. More specifically, there is no terminal history h ∈ Z in
the game where for some stage k ∈ N, for all t < k ι(ht) = 1 and for all t ≥ k ι(ht) = 2.
To track the number of identity changes along the path I define the function φ : N0 → N0
which is given by
φ(n) :=
{
max l(ht) | ht ∈ H such that
T∑
k=0
1{ι(hk) 6=ι(hk+1)} = n
}
,
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function.29 The function φ simply returns the stage at which
there are exactly n alternations between players. Let n be the maximum number of shifts in
the game. Given any stage k and n number of shifts, I refer to k−n as the stage from which
29I write N0 := N ∪ {0}.
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we observe n number of shifts up to stage k and it is computed as k−n = φ(φ−1(k) − n).
Analogously, I define k+n = φ(φ
−1(k)) + n) to be the stage at which n shifts have occurred
after stage k.
The reward mappings gi : H → R are required to fulfill the following conditions. For all
players i, j ∈ I and any pair of stages k, t with k > t
P.1 gi(e
t
i, a) < gi(e
k
i , a) for all e
t
i ∈ E ti , eki ∈ Eki ;
P.2 gi(e
t
i, a) > gi(a, e
k
j ) for all e
t
i ∈ E ti , ekj ∈ Ekj .
The first condition P.1 guarantees that whenever players are active, they prefer to exit the
game at later stages of the game. This implies that if player i is active between stage t and
stage t′, i.e. ι(hk) = i for t ≤ k ≤ t′, then his choice of ending the game in any of these
stages k before stage t′ is strictly dominated by the choice of ending it at stage t′.30
Nevertheless, players face a trade-off between waiting to the active period and terminating
the game in the current active stage determined by condition P.2. Any player prefers to
choose an exit action in the next stage he is active, but in order to reach it he will go
through an inactive stage. The transition between active stages is threatened by having the
opponent exiting the game.
The analysis of preemption games starts by showing that the unique self-referential equi-
librium outcome exhibits player 1 finishing the game at the end of his first active period if
signals arrive in the penultimate active period.
30For instance, consider the bargaining between some group of firms and a labor union. In general, the
labor union bargains with no flexibility until the period of mandatory conciliation by law. This idea also
carries through to inter-active period decisions, basically, agents have incentive to terminate the game at
later stages.
87
Theorem 3.5.3. Let Γ be a preemption game. For any stage k ≥ φ(n), assume that the
self-referential game η-λ permits detection and allows τi ≥ k−1 for any i. Then for any pair
of parameters η, λ there is a unique equilibrium outcome for any code of conduct profile rk
such that rii(h
t, hti) = e
t
i for some e
t
i ∈ E ti and all hti ∈ Hi where t = φ(1)− 1 for player 1 and
t = φ(2)− 1 for player 2.
As in the case of splitting games, signals arriving late play a key role in establishing this
impossibility result, except that now they must arrive after a critical stage that is not nec-
essarily the first stage. The threshold τi ≥ k−1 (with k ≥ φ(n)) is necessarily greater than
the threshold τi ≥ 1, in Theorem 3.5.1 because the critical stage φ(n) is at least three by the
minimum level of alternations assumed, implying that τi ≥ 2. Note that stage k−1 might be
at the very end of the game as is defined by alternations. Thus, if the game lasts for long
horizon T and there are one-period alternations, the critical value k−1 will be T − 1 as the
parameter satisfies φ(n) = T .
To build some intuition for this result, consider without loss k = φ(n) and τi = k−1. Suppose
for a moment that the code of conduct profile stipulates exit in stage, say, k − k′ for some
k′ < k. By assumption P.2, the active player in stage k′−1 deviates from this code of conduct
because he can always terminate the game without being detected as informative signals
are observed afterwards. Accordingly, the candidate profile of codes of conduct rk must
have players exiting after stage k−1. Suppose that it requires exit in period k without loss,
noting that player 2 terminates the game. As before, player 1 wishes to exit at stage k−1 by
assumption P.2, while player 2 observes informative signals after this profitable deviation.
Player 2 would then find it beneficial to choose an exit action at stage k−2. But player 1’s
response to this behavior would be to exit at stage k−3. Proceeding in this way, it turns out
that with timing of signals τi ≥ k−1, there is a unique self-referential equilibrium. In this
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equilibrium, player 1 exits in his first active period terminating the game at stage φ(1)− 1,
whereas player 2 chooses exit actions at the last stage when active φ(1).
In the same sense as in splitting games, the uniqueness of the self-referential equilibrium
outcomes set is independent of the accuracy of signals captured by parameters η and λ.
Precisely, the timing of signals impedes the construction of equilibria that exhibit delayed
exit.
As discussed above, when τi = k−1 for any stage k ≥ φ(n) there is a unique equilibrium
outcome in which the game terminates in the first active period. In what follows, I explore
under what conditions there also exist equilibria with delayed exit. From the previous result
two insights emerge, first the lower bound on the fixed stage φ(n) does not allow players to
use signals at stage k−1 so as to exit later than such stage. The second insight is that the
timing of signals τi depends only on this lower bound.
The following result characterizes self-referential equilibria in which the game terminates
after the first active period only insofar as signals are observed early in the game.
Theorem 3.5.4. Consider a preemption game Γ. For any stage k ≥ φ(2), suppose that the
self-referential game η-λ permits detection and provides τi ≤ k−2 for all i. Then there exist
an ηk > 0, a λk and a code of conduct profile r
k such that for all η ∈ [ηk, 1], λ ∈ [0, λk]
in the self-referential equilibrium player i = ι(hk) chooses an exit action at stage k, i.e.
rii(h
k, hki ) = e
k
i for some e
k
i ∈ Eki and any hki /∈ H i.
Condition k ≥ φ(2) is a mild restriction, requiring that the targeted code of conduct profile
is sufficiently rich so that players can punish intentions of exit before stage k. This is
because any stage below this threshold where the game terminates cannot be a self-referential
equilibrium. To see this, suppose that k < φ(2), say player 2 is active and the code of conduct
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profile dictates exit there. If that is the case, player 1 wishes to exit in his first active period
by condition P.2, meaning that this is the only equilibrium outcome since player 2 cannot
punish this behavior. Clearly, the same argument applies when player 1 is active.
To illustrate the role of the timing of signals in this result, I briefly describe the proof. Fix
a stage k ≥ φ(2), and suppose that player ι is active. Once again, the constructed codes of
conduct must use grim-trigger strategies because of the detection technology assumed here,
stating exit at stage k. First, consider player j 6= ι. By assumption P.2, he has incentives to
deviate at stage k−1, but not at earlier stages by assumption P.1. Correspondingly, player ι
punishes these intentions, whenever there is evidence of such behavior, at stage k−2 which is
possible as τi ≤ k−2. At the same time, player ι may actually exit in the last stage of his active
period containing stage k motivated by condition P.1; therefore, player j will punish these
intentions of behavior at stage k−1 provided that signals point out deviations. Under the
proposed codes of conduct, the incentives to adhere are aligned through the parameterization
of ηk and λk as before. Observe that there is still an equilibrium in which player 1 concludes
the game in his first active period.
As in splitting games, early informative signals permit one to construct self-referential equi-
libria with delayed exit. However, contrary to such class of games, the required stage at which
agents observe signals need not be the initial stage. In contrast to finitely repeated games,
where the point at which signals are observed is completely irrelevant, and splitting games,
in which signals must arrive at the outset in order to construct nontrivial equilibrium, in the
present environment the timing of signals depends only on the stage at which players wish
to terminate the game. The difference hinges on the fact that players can asynchronously
terminate the game and they may remain active for more than one stage.
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Finally, consider the assumptions in Theorem 3.5.4. Because the timing of signals suffices to
construct self-referential equilibrium with exit after the fixed stage k, we obtain the following
result.
Corollary 4. Given stage k, for each stage t ≥ k there is self-referential equilibrium where
player i = ι(ht) plays rii(h
t, hti) = e
t
i for some e
t
i ∈ E ti and each hti /∈ H i.
Proof. This follows by noting that the detection probability ηk from Theorem 3.5.4 allows
us to construct a self-referential equilibrium in which both players adhere to the code of
conduct ri that dictates for player j = ι(ht) the strategy rij(h
t, htj) = e
t
j for some e
t
j ∈ E ti and
any htj /∈ H i.
3.6 Asynchronous Intention Monitoring
So far, I have restricted the analysis to information structures of G(Γ) in which all players
observe signals in the same stage, that is, τi = t
′ for all i and any stage t′. In many
applications, however, agents could have heterogenous abilities to recognize others’ rules of
behavior. For instance, an entry firm may have better information about pricing strategies
than the incumbent. Similarly, consider an underlying game in which one player moves in
early stages and therefore the others might observe his behavior acquiring information before
such player. This section studies an information structure of self-referential games that
allows for heterogeneity in the timing at which players receive private signals, maintaining
the assumption that the timing of signals is deterministic and commonly known. To facilitate
the analysis I focus on two-player discounted, finitely repeated games and exit games.
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The description of the self-referential game is exactly as in Section 3.2.2. Although, the key
difference is the intention monitoring structure so I redefine it here. We say an intention
monitoring structure (Y, pi) is stage-(t, t′) timing if for two stages t, t′ with t 6= t′, for any
code of conduct profile r ∈ R, τ1 = t and τ2 = t′. This definition says that players 1 and 2
receive signals at stages t and t′, respectively.
To begin with, I analyze finitely repeated games with discounting, continue with splitting
games and conclude with preemption games. In particular, the interest is to compare all
previous results with synchronous signals relative to self-referential games with asynchronous
monitoring information structure.
3.6.1 Finitely Repeated Games
In what follows, I will show that all feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs can be
approximated in the self-referential game with asynchronicity as for δ big enough. In fact, the
key qualitative property of self-referential equilibrium in repeated games with synchronicity,
that players can deter deviations regardless of the period in which they observe informative
signals, extends to the case of asynchronicity provided that players are sufficiently patient.
Proposition 3.6.1. Suppose that the self-referential game η-λ permits detection and endows
players with τ1, τ2 ≤ T . For any v ∈ V ∗ and ΓT , there exist δ < 1, ηT > 0 and λT such that
if δ ≥ δ, η ≥ ηT and λ ≤ λT then there is a self-referential equilibrium rT where each player
i gets an expected payoffs approximately equal to vi.
The proof is in Appendix 3.8.4.31
31The rest of the proofs related to this section are also in Appendix 3.8.4.
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Thus, the self-referential folk theorem is independent of asynchronicity. The reason why
asynchronous timing does not affect previous results is that finitely repeated games with
sufficiently patient players are sensitive to the endpoint. In other words, since players are
patient enough they find it optimal to deviate in the last round of the game, implying that for
any asynchronous timing each player has received his private signal by that time, and then
agents simultaneously use this information. The proof follows closely the same structure as
the proof of Theorem 3.4.2.
Recall that Theorem 3.4.2 points out that players observing signals in period T − k could
punish in such period whenever there is evidence of potential deviations. With asynchronous
signals this logic applies as well. Although, for this profile to be a self-referential equilibrium
the punishment stage must be T −k = max(t, t′). Otherwise, the agent receiving signals late
could make an inference about his opponent’s realisation.
3.6.2 Splitting Games
In this class of games, the fact that each player can terminate the game in any period,
together with the properties of reward functions, were identified as the reason why initial-
period signals are required to construct self-referential equilibria that exhibit late exit profiles.
Indeed, every player finds it optimal to exit the game in period zero irrespective of the
code of conduct profile, meaning that each player must observe informative signals at the
outset. With asynchronicity, on the other hand, at least one player receives information
about intentions in period t ≥ 1, that in turn cannot punish the other player intending to
exit in the first period. It is clear then that there is no timing so that the self-referential
equilibrium outcomes set is not unique.
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Proposition 3.6.2. Consider any splitting game Γ. Assume that the self-referential game
η-λ permits detection where any τ1, τ2 ≤ T . Then for all η, λ there exists a unique self-
referential equilibrium outcome where for any r each player i conforms to rii(h
0, h0i ) = e
0
i for
all h0i ∈ Hi and some e0i ∈ E0i .
This result contrasts sharply with the results found in Section 3.5.2, especially, Theorem
3.5.4 that entails conditions such that the construction of equilibrium in which late exit
profiles is possible. As discussed above, in splitting games every player must observe signals
at the outset τi = 0 for a self-referential equilibrium to sustain delayed exit, i.e. e
t ∈ E t for
all periods t ≥ 1. When there is asynchronicity, such delayed exit profiles are not feasible,
thereby leading to immediate exit. This case is of special interest, because it shows that once
we relax the assumption of synchronous intention monitoring, the consequences in terms of
welfare can be quite severe. The impact of heterogeneity in timing of signals on welfare is
characterized by predicting the worst Pareto-ranked payoff vector as the unique equilibrium
outcome.
3.6.3 Preemption Games
Now, I conclude the analysis of asynchronous monitoring structure by revisiting preemption
games. Similar to the case of synchronous timing, I find that there exists a unique equilibrium
outcome in which player 1 exits the game in his first active period while under less restrictive
conditions. In particular, only player 2 may receive signals sufficiently late in the course of
play. As already pointed out, on the other hand, the existence of alternation between players
to exit the game, where such decisions depend only on the targeted code of conduct profile,
may help to construct self-referential equilibrium with late exit profiles.
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From this discussion, I state the next result which parallels Theorem 3.5.3 obtained for
synchronous monitoring structure.
Proposition 3.6.3. Suppose that Γ is a preemption game, and for each stage k ≥ φ(n)
suppose that the self-referential game η-λ permits detection and allows τ2 ≥ k−1 and any τ1.
Then, for any pair η, λ there is a unique self-referential equilibrium outcome such that for all
r each player i chooses rii(h
t, hti) = e
t
i for some e
t
i ∈ E t1, all hti /∈ H i, t = φ(1)− 1 for player
1 and t = φ(2)− 1 for player 2.
The key observation concerns player 2’s timing of signals. If he observes signals in his last
active period (τ2 ≥ k−1), then there is a unique equilibrium outcome in which player 1
leaves the game in the first active period (φ(1) − 1). In contrast to the analogous result
in the synchronous case, this requires only that player 2 receives signals late enough in the
game. The intuition is simple. Suppose that we try to sustain a self-referential equilibrium
exhibiting exit at any stage k ≥ φ(n). Consider first player 2 who cannot observe any
informative cues about his opponent’s behavior until his last active period. As player 1
benefits from exiting later on (by assumption P.1), he finds it optimal to leave the game
at stage k−1 so that he preempts player 2. Then, player 2 chooses to end the game before
this stage knowing that player 1 will not wait until that period, and because he prefers to
be the one terminating the game rather than player 1 by condition P.2. Consequently, this
logic applies to any stage k ≥ φ(n), therefore, both players will exit in their first active
periods. At the end, player 1 exits terminating the game in the last stage of his first active
period. As was the case when signals arrive late relative to the exit profile, η-λ detection
technology—the precision of information—is completely irrelevant.
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As highlighted before, the optimal exit of players is conditioned on the aimed code of conduct.
Thus, one might be interested in knowing whether there exist information structures (Y, pi)
allowing agents to adhere to self-referential equilibrium codes of conduct with delayed exit.
Proposition 3.6.4. Pick any stage k ≥ φ(2) in any preemption game Γ with ι(hk) = ι.
Assume that the self-referential game η-λ permits detection with τi ≤ k−1 and τι ≤ k−2 for
i 6= ι. Then, there are ηk > 0 and λ such that for all η ≥ ηk, λ ≤ λk in the self-referential
equilibrium rk player ι chooses rιι(h
k, hkι ) = e
k
ι for some e
k
ι ∈ Ekι and for each hkι /∈ H ι.
This proposition says that given some stage k (for k ≥ φ(2)) if the self-referential game
allows players to observe signals early relative to the stage k, and these signals are sufficiently
informative, then there is a self-referential equilibrium where the game ends at this particular
stage.
The lower bound φ(2) guarantees that both players are able to punish potential deviations
from any code of conduct. Recall that for any stage k < φ(2), none of the stages within
player 2’s first active period could be sustained as a self-referential equilibrium exit profile,
and that there exists a unique equilibrium outcome.
To see why asynchronous signals do not affect the equilibrium outcomes set, resulting in a
unique prediction as in the case of splitting games, consider a code of conduct profile rk with
exit at stage k ≥ φ(2). Suppose that ι ends the game with j 6= ι. By assumption P.1, player
j and player ι find it optimal to exit at stage k−1 and (k+1 − 1), respectively. The timing of
signals satisfies τj ≤ k−1 and τι ≤ k−2, by implication, such deviations are punishable. What
is more important is that because players cannot terminate the game simultaneously—there
are alternations on active periods between players—the proposed codes of conduct could be
a self-referential equilibrium, as long as signals arrive at different time but allow each player
96
to punish intentions of deviation with accuracy. It remains to find parameters ηk and λk
that balance incentives so that agents prefer to adhere to rk rather than to exit before stage
k.
A further implication of Proposition 3.6.4 is that we can sustain et ∈ E t for t ≥ k in G(Γ)
for some parameters ηt and λt.
Corollary 5. Consider stage k, for any stage t ≥ k there exists a self-referential equilibrium
in which player ι chooses rιι(h
t, htι) = e
t
ι for some e
k
ι ∈ Ekι and all hkι /∈ H ι.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have developed a model that allows agents to learn about opponents’ inten-
tions not only at the outset, but also in the course of the game. This paper characterizes
how the time at which intentions are inferred shapes the size of the equilibrium outcome
set, which in turn crucially depends on the underlying game. Because of this dependence,
by focusing on games with perfect information the role of the signal timing is clearly iden-
tified. In particular, I provide a characterization, for certain classes of games, in terms of
the relation between the number of equilibria in the infinite horizon game and the number
of equilibria in the finite horizon version of the game.
As in the benchmark recognition technology model, I found a significant impact of pre-game
signals on equilibrium outcomes. In particular, for generic games I established a connection
between infinite horizon equilibria and self-referential equilibria of the finite truncation.
A couple of principles emerge from the families of games studied here. First, sustaining the
proposed code of conduct profile as a self-referential equilibrium hinges on agents’ ability to
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anticipate deviations. Of course, the timing of signals must allow players to observe these
signals before the actual deviation, only insofar as observing intentions requires this per
se. More importantly, informative signals may arrive sufficiently in advance for punishment
to be severe, providing agents with incentives to adhere promptly to the code of conduct.
Second, the noisiness of the recognition technology implies that there exist on-equilibrium
punishments that might be very costly to players. Henceforth, even when agents observe
intentions early they might delay punishments to avoid these on-equilibrium costs.
There are three extensions that will be part of future research. Throughout the analysis,
I assumed that the time of arrival is deterministic and commonly known. It would be
interesting to examine what happens when the arrival of signals is stochastic, for example, it
could follow a Bernoulli process. This assumption seems to be natural when a firm, perhaps,
is uncertain whether its opponents have received information about the stage of a developing
product.
The methods developed in this paper can be applied to study other settings, for instance,
repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In that case, although there might be
a tension between public signals and signals from codes of conduct, these two sources of
information would complement each other. The decision to trigger punishments may depend
on sufficient statistics based on public history and on the period in which signals arrive.
Finally, I have considered a recognition technology—η-λ permit detection, which captures
the idea of reciprocal behavior—that allows us to construct simple self-referential equilibria
that uses grim-trigger codes of conduct. With a more general information structure (Y, pi),
one could allow a richer set of detection possibilities, for instance, codes of conduct that
recognize other codes of conduct as long as they provide the same outcome in the game.
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3.8 Proofs
3.8.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Before proving Theorem 3.3.1, I need to state some notation that is used in the proof. The
magnitude of payoffs after stage τ could be measured by the greatest variation in payoffs
due to events after stage τ for any player i ∈ I:
ζτ := {sup |ui(σ)− ui(σˆ)| | i ∈ I, σ, σˆ ∈ Ξ such that στ = σˆτ} .
The constant ζτ describes how much weight we put on payoffs at the tail of the game.
Continuity at infinity implies that limτ→∞ ζτ = 0.32 Lastly, I define the minmax payoff of
player i ∈ I in (mixed strategies) in the τ-truncation Γτ as
ui,τ := min
σ−i,τ|Hτ∈Ξ−i
max
σi,p,τ|Hτ∈Σi
ui(σi,p,τ, σ−i,τ) for histories Hτ ⊂ H,
and I write σ−i,τ to denote the minmax profile against player i, and let σi,p,τ be the best
respond to σ−i,τ by player i. For any σ−i, denote by BRi(σ−i) = argmaxσi∈Ei ui(σi, σ−i) the
set of best responses to σ−i of player i.
To construct the truncation choose an arbitrary strategy σ in the infinite horizon game Γ∞.
In this case it is convenient to work with the strategy σ which is the constant repetition of
the no-decision action a. Then, embed the strategy στ in the truncation version Γ
τ into the
infinite horizon game Γ∞ by concatenating the strategy στ with the strategy σ. The strategy
στ states the plan of play in all stages up to and including stage τ, and that players follow
32To obtain continuity at infinity it suffices to assume that players discount and rewards are bounded
functions, i.e. there exists some constant C such that maxat |gi(at)| < C for all i ∈ I.
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σ in subsequent stages t > τ. I will evaluate the limit of the τ truncation of the game as the
truncation grows, τ → ∞. Since the action space is finite it is sufficient to work with the
product topology.33
Proof. Suppose that τi = 0 for all players i. Fix any subgame perfect equilibrium σˆ ∈ Ξ
of the infinite horizon game Γ∞. Suppose we take a τ-truncation of this game, Γτ. If the
truncated strategy profile σˆτ turns out to be an equilibrium of Γ
τ, then the profile of codes
of conduct rˆτ ∈ R chosen by all players i is rˆij(ht, htj) = σˆtj,τ(ht) for all j ∈ I, ht ∈ H and
htj ∈ Hj. It follows immediately that it would form a self-referential equilibrium.
On the other hand, suppose that σˆτ is not an equilibrium of the truncated game Γ
τ. Let σi,τ
be the optimal deviation of player i from σˆτ, that is, σi,τ ∈ BRi(σˆ−i,τ). Pick the profile of
codes of conduct rˆτ ∈ R which prescribes for all i, j ∈ I:
rˆij(h
t, htj) :=

σˆtj,τ(h
t) for all ht ∈ H t, htj /∈ H tj,
σt−i,τ otherwise.
If all players choose rˆi, player i gets an expected payoff equal to Ui(rˆ) = ui(σˆτ). If not,
suppose that player i’s choice involves some code of conduct r˜i such that r˜ii(h
t, hti) = σ
t
i,τ(h
t)
for all yti ∈ Y ti and for any j 6= i it says r˜ij = rˆij. Let the highest payoffs associated to r˜i for
player i be W i ≥ Ui(r˜i, rj), and it is given by
W i = ui(σi,τ, σˆi,τ) + ητ,i(ui(στ, σ−i,τ)− ui(σi,τ, σˆi,τ)).
33A sequence {σi,n}n∈N converges to σi in the product topology if and only if σi,n(h) → σi(h) for any
h ∈ H.
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From this, adherence to rˆτ requires that Ui(rˆ) ≥ W i, namely, for each player i ∈ I:
ητ,i =
ui(σi,τ, σˆ−i,τ)− ui(σˆτ)
ui(σi,τ, σˆ−i,τ)− ui(στ, σ−i,τ)
.
We take the maximum of these probabilities of detection, thus, ητ := maxi∈I ητ,i and this
constitutes the lower threshold such that players find it optimal to adhere to code of conduct
profile rˆ. Whenever η ≥ ητ the proposed code of conduct profile rˆ is a Nash equilibrium of
the self-referential game defined on the truncated game Γτ.
Finally, for this τ-truncation Γτ we may find an upper bound on the probability of detection
ητ. Recall that σˆ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game Γ
∞. Thus,
for any player i we may bound the numerator of the last expression as follows
ui(σi,τ, σˆ−i,τ)− ui(σˆτ) ≤ ui(σi,τ, σˆ−i,τ)− ui(σˆτ) + ui(σˆ)− ui(σi, σˆ−i)
≤ 2ζτ (3.1)
and working similarly on the denominator we find the bound
ui(σi,τ, σˆ−i,τ)− ui(στ, σ−i,τ) ≤ ui(σi,τ, σˆ−i,τ)− ui(στ, σ−i,τ) + ui(σˆ)− ui(σi, σˆ−i)
≤ 2ζτ + ui(σˆτ)− ui(στ, σ−i,τ) (3.2)
Hence, combining expressions (3.1) and (3.2) we get
ητ ≤ 2ζ
τ
2ζτ + ui(σˆτ)− ui(στ, σ−i,τ)
By continuity at infinity for all ε > 0 we can find a sufficiently long τ-truncation τ∗ ∈ N
such that for all τ > τ∗, |ui(σ∞)− ui(σˆ∞)| < ε/2 where στ = σˆτ, then ητ < ε.
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3.8.2 Proofs for Section 3.4
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. First, note that timing must be τi = 0 for any i. Then, fix any
feasible and strictly individually rational payoff vector v ∈ V ∗. Suppose that v = g(a∗) for
some profile of actions a∗ ∈ A, and let M := maxa∈A,i∈I gi(a) and m := mina∈A,i∈I gi(a) be
the maximum and minimum possible payoffs for any player i ∈ I.34 For if the profile of
actions a∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, then the code of conduct vector rˆ
would require that all players i ∈ I select rˆi ∈ R0 such that for all i, j ∈ I, rˆij(h0, h0j) = a∗j
for all private histories h0j ∈ Hj. Notice that the self-referential strategy calls for the static
Nash equilibrium strategy.
Contrary, suppose that the action profile a∗ ∈ A is not a Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Consider the profile of codes of conduct rˆ ∈ R: For all i, j ∈ I,
rˆij(h
0, h0j) :=

a∗j if h
0
j /∈ Hj,
α−i h
0
j ∈ Hj.
It remains to show that this profile of codes of conduct rˆ forms a self-referential equilibrium
for a sufficiently high probability of detection ηT . For some profile r ∈ R, let W i(r) be the
lowest expected payoffs for any player i given profile r ∈ R. Suppose that all players adhere
to the profile of codes of conduct rˆ, then W i(rˆ) is given by the following expression
W i(rˆ) = gi(a
∗)+(1−(1−λ)2)(gi(α−j, a∗j)−gi(a∗)−(M−m))+pij(yj|rˆ)(gi(a∗i , α−i)−gi(a∗)).
Consider instead that player i chooses an alternative code of conduct r˜i ∈ R0, r˜i 6= rˆi
that says for any private history hti ∈ Hi, player i chooses some action ai ∈ Ai where
34The same proof works for the case of mixed strategies, α.
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ai ∈ argmaxa˜i∈Ai gi(a˜i, a∗j) ≥ gi(a∗), and for the rest of the players j 6= i it states r˜ij = rˆij.
Given that j ∈ I \ {i} adhere to the code of conduct rˆ, then the highest expected payoff for
player i, denoted by W i(r˜
i) is
W i(r˜
i) = gi(ai, a
∗
j) + (1− (1− λ)2)(gi(ai, a∗j)− gi(α−j, a∗j) + (M −m))
+ (pij(yj|rˆ) + η)(gi(a∗i , α−i)− gi(a∗) + gi(α−j, a∗j)− gi(ai, a∗j)).
In order to have any player i adhering to the profile of codes of conduct rˆ, it requires that
W i(rˆ) ≥ W i(r˜i), namely, W i(rˆ)−W i(r˜i) ≥ ε for some ε > 0. Then, players find it optimal
to follow the profile of codes of conduct rˆ if the probability of detecting deviations from code
of conduct profile ηi,T satisfies the following condition
ηi,0κ1 ≥ gi(ai, a∗j)− gi(a∗) + 2λκ2,
where κ1 = gi(a
∗
i , α−i) − gi(a∗) + gi(α−j, a∗j) − gi(ai, a∗j) and κ2 = gi(ai, a∗j) + gi(a∗) −
2gi(α−j, a
∗
j) + 2(M −m). Take the highest probability of detection among players so that
the last condition holds for all players i. Let η0 := maxi∈I ηi,0. Given this probability, we
pin down λ0; for any ε > 0
λ0 :=
1 + gi(a
∗)− gi(ai, a∗j)
2κ2
− ε.
It follows that if the probability of detection is high enough, that is η ≥ η0, and on-equilibrium
punishments are not too costly λ ≤ λ0, then the profile of codes of conduct rˆ is a self-
referential equilibrium.
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I will make use of the following piece of notation to prove the next result. Let σh
t
i := {σi |
σki = a
k
i with a
t
i ∈ hk,∀k ≤ t} be the strategy σi modified in the information sets of player
i preceding ht so that it prescribes the pure actions that induce the history ht, with profile
σh
t
= (σh
t
i , σ
ht
−i). Observe that multistage games with observed actions have unique set of
actions from σh
t
at each of the previous information set. For any history ht ∈ H, let σi,p|ht
denote the continuation strategy prescribed by σi,p after history h
t and let σi,p|H t denote
the restriction of σi,p to the subset of histories H
t ⊂ H. For strategy profile σp I write σp|ht
and σp|H t, respectively. Likewise for behavioral strategies. Let ui(σp|ht) be the continuation
payoff to player i induced by the strategy profile σp ∈ Σ conditional on ht being reached:
ui(σp|ht) =
∞∑
t′=t
δt
′
i gi(a
t′(σh
t
p ))
Because actions are observed, the strategy profile σh
t
determines a unique history of length
l(ht) in which we reach ht. Thus payoffs can be written as, for all players i ∈ I
ui(σ
ht) =
t−1∑
t′=0
δt
′
i gi(a
t′(σh
t
)) + δtiui(σ
ht|ht)
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2. From Theorem 3.3.1, signals are more useful the earlier they arrive.
It is then sufficient to consider τi = T for all i. Start by picking any feasible and strictly
individually rational payoff vector v ∈ V ∗. Again, assume that v = g(a∗) for some profile of
actions a∗ ∈ A.35 First, if the profile of actions a∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of the stage
game then the profile of codes of conduct rˆ would require that all players i ∈ I select rˆi ∈ R0
such that for all i, j ∈ I, rˆij(ht, htj) = a∗j for all histories ht ∈ H, htj ∈ H tj . It follows rˆ would
be a self-referential equilibrium.
Otherwise, we begin with the construction of the trigger strategy denoted by σˆi,T . This
35The same argument applies to mixed strategies.
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strategy is defined as, for all players, i ∈ I
σˆi,T (h
t) :=

a∗i if t = 0 or h
s = a∗s for 0 ≤ s ≤ t− 1,
α−j otherwise.
Since the profile of strategies σˆT is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the finitely repeated
game ΓT by backward induction argument, there exists at least one profitable one-shot
deviation. It is enough to study the case in which there are two of the kind. We define two
profitable one-shot deviations denoted by σi,T and σ
′
i,T for each player i ∈ I, any two actions
ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai and public history hT ∈ H:
σi,T (h
s) :=

σˆi,T (h
s) if hs 6= hT ,
ai if h
s = hT ,
and σ′i,T (h
s) :=

σˆi,T (h
s) if hs 6= hT−1,
a′i if h
s = hT−1.
That is, strategies σi,T and σ
′
i,T have different timing of deviation and potentially different
deviation actions. We pick the threshold discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) so that for all players
i ∈ I
ui(σi,T , σˆ−i,T ) ≥ ui(σ′i,T , σˆ−i,T )
It is sufficient to have δ satisfying
δ =
M −mini∈I vi
mini∈I vi −m
Given δ, each player i ∈ I may only find a profitable one-shot deviation at the final round
of the finitely repeated game ΓT . We may restrict attention to all discount factors δ such
that δ ∈ (δ, 1). We write σj,ti for the strategy of player i that is the minmax strategy against
player j ∈ I \ {i} at period t ≥ 0 (constant repetition of the minmax strategy α−j) with
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profile σt = (σ−i,ti , σ
i,t
−i). We now proceed to construct the profile of codes of conduct rˆ ∈ R
such that for all i, j ∈ I:
rˆij(h
t, htj) :=

σˆtj,T (h
t) if htj /∈ Hj, for all t ≥ 0,
σi,tj (h
t) if htj ∈ Hj, for t = T.
We claim that this profile of codes of conduct rˆ forms a self-referential equilibrium for a
sufficiently high probability of detection ηT . Given the choice of δ the optimal deviation
for any player i ∈ I from this profile rˆ is the strategy σi,T we defined above. Observe that
the strategy σi,T only differs from σˆ
i after period T − 1. Let hˆT = (a∗0, . . . , a∗T−1) be the
T -length history induced by strategy profile (σi,T , σˆ−i,T ) which in turn is also induced by the
strategy profile σˆT . For history hˆ
T if all players adhere to the profile of codes of conduct rˆ,
the least expected payoff for any player i ∈ I by adhering is
W i(rˆ) =
1− δ
1− δT+1
[
T−1∑
t=0
δtgi(a
t(σˆhˆ
T
))+δT
(
gi(a
∗)+(1−(1−λ)2)(gi(α−j, a∗j)−gi(a∗)−(M−m))
+ pij(yj|r)(gi(a∗i , α−i)− gi(a∗))
)]
Suppose instead that player i chooses the code of conduct r˜i ∈ R0 where he plays r˜ii(ht, hti) =
σti,T (h
t) for any private history hti ∈ H ti , and rˆij = r˜ij for all j ∈ I \{i}. Given that j ∈ I \{i}
adhere to the code of conduct rˆT , then the highest expected payoff for player i is
W i(r˜
i, rˆj) =
1− δ
1− δT+1
[
T−1∑
t=0
δtgi(a
t(σhˆ
T
i , σˆ
hˆT
−i )) + δ
T
(
gi(ai, a
∗
j) + (1− (1− λ)2)(gi(ai, a∗j)
− gi(α−j, a∗j) + (M −m)) + (pij(yj|r) + η)(gi(a∗i , α−i)− gi(a∗)
+ gi(α−j, a
∗
j)− gi(ai, a∗j))
)]
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We now find ηi,T as the minimum probability of detection that the self-referential game must
satisfy to deter player i choosing the code of conduct r˜i, i.e. W i(rˆ) ≥ W i(r˜i, rˆj). Thus,
ηˆi,Tκ1 ≥ gi(ai, a∗j)− gi(a∗) + 2λκ2
where κ1 = gi(a
∗
i , α−i) − gi(a∗) + gi(α−j, a∗j) − gi(ai, a∗j) and κ2 = gi(ai, a∗j) + gi(a∗) −
2gi(α−j, a
∗
j) + 2(M −m). Set ηT := maxi∈I ηi,T , and to pin down λT , let this bound satisfies
λT :=
1+gi(a
∗)−gi(ai,a∗j )
2κ2
− ε for some ε > 0. By construction, the profile of codes of conduct rˆT
is a self-referential equilibrium. Moreover, the expected payoffs for any player i ∈ I under rˆ
is at least
W i(rˆ) = vi−
(1− δ)δT
1− δT+1
(
(1−(1−λ)2)(gi(α−j, a∗j)−gi(a∗)−(M−m))+η(gi(a∗i , α−i)−gi(a∗))
)
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. Fix any v ∈ V ∗, again assume that vi = gi(a∗) for all i ∈ I for
some a∗ ∈ A. If a∗ ∈ A is an equilibrium the argument follows from using the profile of
codes of conduct that ignores signals, that is, for all players i, j ∈ I the code of conduct says
r˘ij(h
t, htj) = a
∗
j for any history h
t ∈ H, htj ∈ Hj. Otherwise, construct strategies σT and σˆT as
in the proof Theorem 3.4.2 from which we pick δ and consider δ ≥ δ. The proposed profile
of codes of conduct r˘ ∈ R is such that for all players i, j ∈ I and all public histories ht ∈ H
r˘ij(h
t, htj) :=

σˆtj,T (h
t) if htj /∈ H tj, for all t ≥ 0,
σi,tj (h
t) if htj ∈ H tj, for all t ≥ T − k.
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We obtain the probability of detection η˘T by following the proof of Theorem 3.4.2. (I omit
the calculation of the probability of detection ηT in the analogous result to Theorem 3.4.2
when λ = 0.) With these probabilities in hand, we show that
η˘T := max
i∈I
η˘i,T =
ui(σ
hˆT−k
i , σˆ
hˆT−k
−i |hˆT−k)− ui(σˆhˆT−k |hˆT−k)
ui(σhˆ
T−k
i , σˆ
hˆT−k
−i |hˆT−k)− ui(σhˆT−ki , σi,hˆ
T−k
−i |hˆT−k)
≤ ui(σ
hˆT−k
i , σˆ
hˆT−k
−i |hˆT−k)− ui(σˆhˆT−k |hˆT−k))
ui(σhˆ
T
i , σˆ
hˆT
−i |hˆT )− ui(σhˆTi , σi,hˆ
T
−i |hˆT )
=
ui(σ
hˆT
i , σˆ
hˆT
−i |hˆT )− ui(σˆhˆT |hˆT ))
ui(σhˆ
T
i , σˆ
hˆT
−i |hˆT )− ui(σhˆTi , σi,hˆ
T
−i |hˆT )
= ηˆT,i
≤ max
i∈I
ηˆT,i := ηˆT
The first inequality follows from the fact that the profile of strategies (σhˆ
T−k
i , σˆ
hˆT−k
−i ) differs
from the profile of strategies (σhˆ
T
i , σˆ
hˆT
−i ) after period T − 1 for a given player i. Moreover,
the punishment profile (σhˆ
T−k
i , σ
i,hˆT−k
−i ) triggered in period T − k would be harsher than
punishment profile triggered in the last period (σhˆ
T
i , σ
i,hˆT
−i ). The equality after this inequality
follows from the construction in which players find it optimal to deviate in the last period
of the repeated game. Finally, for all players i ∈ I the least expected payoff by adhering to
r˘ is given by Ui(r˘) = vi.
3.8.3 Proofs for Section 3.5
Proof of Theorem 3.5.1. First note that for splitting games the best feasible stage-t timing
intention monitoring structure of the self-referential game G(Γ) is τi = 1 for all i, because
players have strong incentives to exit early, and by Proposition 3.4.1, earlier signals allows
agents to construct broader codes of conduct as self-referential equilibria. We select the
108
profile of codes of conduct rˆ ∈ R so that for all players i, j ∈ I
rˆij(h
t, htj) :=

stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j /∈ H tj, for all t ≥ 0,
stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j ∈ H tj, for all t ≥ 1.
Fix some period 1 ≤ tˆ ≤ T . For all players i, the strategy si ∈ Si is given by sti(ht, hti) = f ti
for all t < tˆ, ht ∈ H and some forward action f ti ∈ F ti ; and for all t ≥ tˆ sti(ht, hti) = eti for
some exit action eti ∈ E ti and ht ∈ H. The strategy si ∈ Si is given by s0i (h0) = f 0i for
f 0i ∈ F0i , and sti(ht, hti) = eti for all t ≥ 1, eti ∈ E ti , ht ∈ H. The lowest expected payoff for any
player i ∈ I from adherence to this code of conduct profile gives
W i(rˆ) = wi − δtˆici − (1− (1− λ)2)δtˆici − pij(yj|rˆ)(wi − δtˆici).
Alternatively, let r˜i be the optimal code of conduct against rˆ. By assumptions S.1 and S.2,
this code of conduct calls for immediate deviation in period tˆ − 1. Formally, r˜ii(ht, hti) = s˜ti
for all histories hti ∈ H ti and some strategy s˜i ∈ Si with s˜i 6= si. The strategy s˜i unravels as
follows, s˜ti(h
t, hti) = f
t
i for all t < tˆ − 1, ht ∈ H, hti ∈ H ti and f ti ∈ F ti ; and s˜ti(ht, hti) = eti for
any ht ∈ H, hti ∈ H ti and eti ∈ E ti for all t ≥ tˆ− 1. For all players j 6= i, it says r˜ij = rˆij.
This gives an expected payoff of Ui(r˜
i, rˆj) = wi which is higher than W i(rˆ) the lowest
expected payoff under the profile rˆ. In fact, if λ = 0, the expected payoff for player i is
Ui(rˆ) = wi − δtˆici. This is for any arbitrary period tˆ. Observe that all alternative codes
of conduct will require deviation in the first period of the game. In particular, we are left
only with codes of conduct which ignore signals arriving at any period t ≥ 1. For instance,
pick the profile of codes of conduct r˜ that is characterized by the following behavior: for
all i, j ∈ I, such that r˜ij(ht, htj) = s˜tj(ht) for all htj ∈ H tj , t ≥ 0 and for some s˜i ∈ Si. The
strategy s˜i states that s˜
t
i(h
t, hti) = e
t
i for all t ≥ 0 with eti ∈ E ti . In equilibrium, each player
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gets Ui(r˜) = wi − ci. Any deviation from this profile of codes of conduct gives expected
payoffs of 0. This profile constitutes a self-referential equilibrium with the unique outcome
where all players i exit in period t = 0.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.2. From Theorem 3.5.1, for any r such that rii()˙ = e
t
i in any period
t > 0, each player i finds it optimal to choose an alternative code of conduct, playing some
exit action e0i ∈ E0i , guaranteeing himself wi irrespective of what his opponents do. This is
because (Y, pi) satisfies τi = t for some t > 0 and for all i. However, here (Y, pi) provides
τi = 0 for any i. Pick some period k ∈ N with 0 ≤ k ≤ T . Let us focus on the profile of
codes of conduct rˆ ∈ R so that for all players i, j ∈ I
rˆij(h
t, htj) :=

stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j /∈ H tj,
stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j ∈ H tj.
In strategy si ∈ Si, player i chooses sti(ht, hti) = f ti for some f ti ∈ F ti , any ht ∈ H and all
periods t ≤ k − 1; and sti(ht, hti) = eti for some eti ∈ E ti , history ht ∈ H and all periods t ≥ k.
In addition, the strategy si ∈ Si is described as sti(ht, hti) = eti for some eti ∈ E ti , ht ∈ H and
all t ≥ 0. The lowest expected payoffs associated to this profile are
W i(rˆ) = wi − δki ci + (1− (1− λ)2)δki ci − pij(yj|rˆ)(wi − δki ci).
One alternative optimal code of conduct could be r˜i such that r˜ii(h
t, hti) = s˜
t
i(h
t, hti) for all
hti ∈ H ti , some strategy s˜i ∈ Si, and r˜ij = rˆij for all j 6= i. Here, the strategy s˜i ∈ Si requires
s˜ti(h
t, hti) = f
t
i for some f
t
i ∈ F ti , ht ∈ H and all t < k − 1; and s˜ti(ht, hti) = eti for some
eti ∈ E ti , ht ∈ H and all t ≥ k − 1. Thus, it gives an expected payoff of at most W i for player
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i.
W i(r˜
i) = wi − (pij(yj|rˆ) + η)(wi − δki ci).
Thus, for ε > 0 we must have W i(rˆ) ≥ W i(r˜i) + ε. Working in the same line as in the proof
of Theorem 3.5.1, we find the required probability of detection ηk := maxi∈I ηi,k to sustain
this profile of codes of conduct rˆ where each ηi,k is given by ηi,k = δ
k
i ci(1− λ)2/(wi − δki ci).
Then, take λk such that it satisfies (1− λk)2δci ≤ (wi − δci)(1− ε) for some ε > 0.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.3. It is sufficient to take stage k = φ(n). Note that player 2 makes a
choice at this stage, i.e. ι(hk) = 2. Suppose that players adhere to the code-of-profile profile
r ∈ R, where for players i prescribes
rij(h
t, htj) :=

stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j /∈ H tj,
stj(h
t, htj) otherwise.
where for player 1, the strategy s1 ∈ S1 requires st1(ht, ht1) = f t1 for all t ≥ 0, and the strategy
s1 ∈ S1 is given by st1(ht, ht1) = f t1 for all t < k−1 and st1(ht, ht1) = et1 for all t ≥ k−1. On the
other hand, for player 2 his strategy s2 = s2 with s2, s2 ∈ S2 says that st2(ht, ht2) = f t2 for all
0 ≤ t < T , and sT2 (hT , hT2 ) = eT2 . It is clear that player 2 finds it optimal to adhere to this
code of conduct, it is the highest possible payoff. However, player 2 will detect deviations
from the equilibrium code of conduct while he is inactive at stage k−1—that is, ι(hk−1) = 2.
Player 1 could deviate from this code at stage k−1 and get g1(e
k−1
1 , a). By adhering to the
code of conduct, player 1 obtains g1(a, e
T
2 ). By assumption S.2, player 1 finds it optimal
not to adhere. The same argument goes through any stage k < φ(n). If that it is the case,
consider a profile r where for some stage t player ι(ht) chooses an exit action etι(ht) and f
k
ι(ht)
for any k 6= t, moreover, player j 6= ι(ht) plays fkj for all k. But again player j would be
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better off by exiting at stage t−1, i.e. gj(e
t−1
j , a) > gj(a, e
t
ι(ht)). This implies players exit
whenever they are active and that the code of conduct profile r ∈ R such that all players i
choose exit actions, i.e. rii(h
t, hti) = e
t
i for all e
t
i ∈ E ti , hti /∈ H ti, ht ∈ H where t = φ(1)− 1 for
player 1, and t = φ(1) for player 2 is the unique self-referential equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.4. Pick any stage k ∈ N such that k ≥ φ(2) and in which the game
ends will end in equilibrium. It suffices to check the case τi = k−2 for each i. Suppose that
the code of conduct profile rˆ ∈ R where all players i choose according to
rij(h
t, htj) :=

stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j /∈ H tj,
stj(h
t, htj) otherwise.
Let ι = ι(hk) be the active player that ends the game at stage k. Player ι’s strategies satisfy
for all stages t < k, stι(h
t, htι) = f
t
ι for all public histories h
t ∈ H, private histories htι /∈ H ι,
and forward actions f tι ∈ F tι ; and for all stages such that t ≥ k it requires stι(ht, htι) = etι for
all ht ∈ H, htι /∈ H ι and exit actions etι ∈ E tι . For the punishment strategy stι, for all stages
t < k−2 − 1 it would be stι(ht, htι) = f tι for all ht ∈ H, htι ∈ H ι and f tι ∈ F tι ; and for all
t ≥ k−2 − 1 it says stι(ht, htι) = etι for all ht ∈ H, htι ∈ H ι and etι ∈ E tι . On the other hand,
for inactive player i 6= ι(hk) at stage k, her strategy is as follows. For all stages t ≥ 0, the
strategy si requires s
t
i(h
t, hti) = f
t
i for all h
t ∈ H, hti /∈ H i and f ti ∈ F ti . The punishment
strategy sti says that for all stages t < k−1 − 1 we have that sti(ht, hti) = f ti for all ht ∈ H,
hti ∈ H i and f ti ∈ F ti ; and for all t ≥ k−1 − 1 it must be the case that sti(ht, htj) = etj for all
ht ∈ H, hti ∈ H ti and eji ∈ E ti .
Next, we find a sufficiently high probability of detection. To do so, the optimal alternative
code of conduct for player ι is the following. For player i, r˜ιi(h
t, hti) = rˆ
ι
i and r˜
ι
ι(h
t, htι) = sι
where sι ∈ Sι is as follows, for all ht ∈ H and htι ∈ Hι, for any t ≤ k, s˜ιι(ht, htι) = f tι for
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f tι ∈ F tι ; and for all t ≥ k+1 − 1, s˜ιι(ht, htι) = etι for etι ∈ E tι . The lowest expected payoffs by
adhering to rˆ for player ι is
W ι(rˆ) = gι(e
k
ι , a) + (1− (1− λ)2)(gι(ek−1ι , a)− gι(ekι , a)) + pii(yi|rˆ)(gι(a, ek−1i )− gι(ekι , a))
If r˜ι is chosen instead,
W ι(r˜
ι) = gι(e
k+1−1
ι , a)− (pii(yi|rˆ) + η)(gι(ek+1−1ι , a)− gι(a, ek−1i ))
For ι, it means that ηι,k satisfies W ι(rˆ)−W ι(r˜ι) ≥ 0
gι(e
k
ι , a) + (1− (1− λ)2)(gι(ek−1ι , a)− gι(ekι , a)) + pii(yi|rˆ)(gι(a, ek−1i )− gι(ekι , a))
− gι(ek+1−1ι , a) + (pii(yi|rˆ) + ηι,k)(gι(ek+1−1ι , a)− gι(a, ek−1i )) ≥ 0
Then, λι,k, for any ε > 0 is given by
gι(e
k+1−1
ι , a)−gι(ekι , a)−(1−(1−λ)2)(gι(ek−1ι , a)−gι(ekι , a))−pii(yi|rˆ)(gι(a, ek−1i )−gι(ek+1−1ι , a))
≤ ((1− ε) + pii(yi|rˆ))(gι(ek+1−1ι , a)− gι(a, ek−1i ))
The optimal code of conduct for player i, in this case, is r˜ii(h
t, hti) = s˜
t
i with for all t < k−1,
s˜ti(h
t, hti) = f
t
i , for any h
t ∈ H, hti ∈ H ti and f ti ∈ F ti ; and for all t ≥ k−1, s˜ti(ht, hti) = eti for
ht ∈ H, hti ∈ H ti and eti ∈ E ti . For player i, W i(rˆ)−W i(r˜i) ≥ 0
ηi,k(gi(e
k
i , a)− gi(ek−1i , a)) = gi(a, ek−2ι )− gi(eki , a)− (1− (1− λ)2)(gi(ek−1i , a)− gi(eki , a))
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Thus, λi,k must satisfy for ε > 0
gi(a, e
k−2
ι )− gi(eki , a)− (1− (1− λ)2)(gi(ek−1i , a)− gi(eki , a)) ≤ (1− ε)(gi(eki , a)− gi(ek−1i , a))
Taking both ηk := maxi ηi,k and λk := maxi λi,k, the profile rˆ forms a self-referential equilib-
rium.
3.8.4 Proofs for Section 3.6
Proof of Proposition 3.6.1. Fix any τ1, τ2 ≤ T where by asynchronicity τ1 6= τ2. Let v ∈ V ∗.
Assume vi = gi(a
∗) for a∗ ∈ A. If a∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, then the code of conduct
for all i, j, the code of conduct rˆij(h
t, htj) = a
∗
j for all h
t ∈ H, htj ∈ Hj forms a self-referential
equilibrium for any η, λ. Otherwise, focus on δ > δ such that players only deviate in T . Then
we can mimic the the proof approach used for Theorem 3.4.2, it follows r is a self-referential
equilibrium here as well.
Proof of Proposition 3.6.2. Suppose that τ1, τ2 ≤ T , τ1 6= τ2 and say τ1 < τ2 provided by
(Y, pi).36 Pick some k ∈ N, 0 < k ≤ T such that k ≥ τ1, τ2. Observe that if k ≤ τ1, since the
game ends in period k, player 2 receives her signal too late to materialise any punishment.
Let ri be the code of conduct ∀i, j
rij(h
t, htj) :=

stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j /∈ H tj, for all t ≥ 0,
stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j ∈ H tj, for all t ≥ 0.
36The argument is invariant to permutation.
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By triggering punishments in period τ2 none of the players can infer opponent’s yi. Let
si ∈ Si be for all periods t ≤ k, si(ht, hti) = f ti for all ht ∈ H, hti /∈ H i and f ti ∈ F ti , and
for all t ≥ k we have si(ht, hti) = eti for any ht ∈ H, hti /∈ H i and eti ∈ E ti . For si ∈ Si,
for all t < τ2, si(h
t, hti) = f
t
i for h
t ∈ H, hti ∈ H i and f ti ∈ F ti , and for all t ≥ τ2 it says
si(h
t, hti) = e
t
i for h
t ∈ H, hti ∈ H i and eti ∈ E ti . Then, the lower bound in expected payoffs
is given by
W i(r) = wi − δki ci − (1− (1− λ)2)δki ci − pij(yj|r)(wi − δki ci).
The punishment under this timing must occur in period τ2 so that player 2 does not infer
player 1 receive a signal in Y1 \ Y 1 if he continues playing. For player 1, it is clear that the
alternative code of conduct r˜1 stating that r˜11 = s1 where s1(h
t, ht1) = e
t
1 for all h
t ∈ H,
ht1 ∈ H1, t ≥ τ1 and et1 ∈ E t1, and for his opponent r˜12 = r12 gives higher payoffs as it delivers
a payoff of w1. Moreover, player 2 finds it optimal to choose the alternative code of conduct
rˆ2 where rˆ22 = s2 where s2(h
t, ht2) = e
t
2 for all h
t ∈ H, ht2 ∈ H2, t ≥ τ1 − 1 and et2 ∈ E t2, and
for t < τ1 − 1 simply s2(ht, ht2) = f t2, for all ht ∈ H, ht2 ∈ H2 and f t2 ∈ F t2. Finally for player
1 it requires rˆ21 = r
2
1. This gives a payoff of w2. For both players is optimal to not adhere
to ri. Moreover, the same logic applies to any timing even for the case τ1 = 0 and τ2 = 1.
Suppose that we aim to have an exit profile after period 1 (or even in period 1). Player 1
can always exit in period t = 0 taking his surplus w1 without paying the cost because player
2 receives her signal about player 1’s intentions to exit when this actually already happened
while the game ended so no punishment is possible. By choosing the code of conduct ri such
that rij = sj with sj(h
,htj) = e
t
j for all t, h
t ∈ H, htj ∈ H tj and any etj ∈ E tj . It follows that the
only equilibrium outcome in the self-referential game exhibits all players exiting in period
t = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.6.3. Suppose without loss of generality that k = φ(n). Recall that
the timing is such that τ2 = k−1. Pick τ1, say, τ1 = t′ with 0 ≤ t′ ≤ k−2. Then we aim to
construct a code of conduct featuring exit at stage k. To do this, consider
rij(h
t, htj) :=

stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j /∈ H tj, for all t,
stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j ∈ H tj, for all t.
The code of conduct states for player 2, thus, r22 = s2 for s2 ∈ S2 where for all t ≥ k,
s2(h
t, ht2) = f
t
2 for all h
t ∈ H, ht2 ∈ H2, and f t2 ∈ F t2, while for t ≥ k it requires s2(ht, ht2) = et2
for all ht ∈ H, ht2 ∈ H2, and et2 ∈ E t2. In addition, s2 = s2. On the other hand, for player
1 it says for all t ≥ 0, s1(ht, ht1) = f t1 for all ht ∈ H, ht1 /∈ H1, and f t1 ∈ F t1, whereas for
any t ≤ k−1, s1(ht, ht1) = f t1, for all ht ∈ H, ht1 ∈ H1, and f t1 ∈ F t1; and for t ≥ k−1,
s1(h
t, ht1) = e
t
1, for all h
t ∈ H, ht1 ∈ H1, and et1 ∈ E t1.
Again, player 2 has no incentives to deviate by condition P.1 and P.2 on reward mappings.
It remains to check player 1. Consider the optimal deviation to this code of conduct r,
denoted by r˜1 such that r˜12 = r
1
2. For player 1, r˜
1
1 = s˜1 so that for all t ≤ φ(n) − 1, this
strategy is s˜1(h
t, ht1) = f
t
1, for all h
t ∈ H, ht1 ∈ H1, and f t1 ∈ F t1. For all t ≥ φ(n) − 1,
s˜1(h
t, ht1) = e
t
1, for all h
t ∈ H, ht1 ∈ H1, and et1 ∈ E t1. This gives a lower bound of at least
g1(e
φ(n)−1
1 , a) > g1(a, e
k
2) by condition (ii). Trying to sustain exit actions before will imply
that player 2 is not able to observe signals sufficiently in advance. This argument can be
applied to any other exit profile. Henceforth, the unique equilibrium outcome is player 1
leaving the game at stage φ(1)− 1, and player 2 exiting at φ(n).
Proof of Proposition 3.6.4. First, the requirement k ≥ φ(2) ensures that both players have
a incentive to continue beyond their first active period, determined by condition P.2 on
reward mappings. Pick a stage k ∈ N such that φ(2) ≤ k ≤ T . We aim to construct a
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code of conduct where player ι(hk) exits the game in stage k as he is active. For notational
convenience, write ι(hk) = ι. Recall that τι ≤ k−2 and τi ≤ k−1. The proposed code of
conduct is ri requires for all i, j
rij(h
t, htj) :=

stj(h
t, htj) if h
t
j /∈ H tj,
stj(h
t, htj) otherwise.
Therefore, the strategy for player ι is for all t < k, stι(h
t, htι) = f
t
ι for all h
t ∈ H, htι /∈ H ι,
and f tι ∈ F tι ; and for all t ≥ k, stι(ht, htι) = etι for all ht ∈ H, htι /∈ H ι, and etι ∈ E tι . Further,
the punishment strategy is such that for all t < k−2, stι(h
t, htι) = f
t
ι for all h
t ∈ H, htι ∈ H ι,
and f tι ∈ F tι , moreover, for all t ≥ k−2, stι(ht, htι) = etι for all ht ∈ H, htι ∈ H ι, and etι ∈ E tι .
It remains to state the strategies for player i with i 6= ι. For player i, for each t < k,
sti(h
t, hti) = f
t
i for all h
t ∈ H, hti /∈ H i, and f ti ∈ F ti ; and for all t ≥ k, sti(ht, hti) = eti for all
ht ∈ H, hti /∈ H i, and eti ∈ E ti . Similar to player ι but with different timing the punishment
strategy is characterized by: for all t < k−1, sti(h
t, hti) = f
t
i for all h
t ∈ H, hti ∈ H i, and
f ti ∈ F ti , moreover, for all t ≥ k−1, sti(ht, hti) = eti for all ht ∈ H, hti ∈ H i, and eti ∈ E ti . By
parameterizing ηk and λk as in Theorem 3.5.4, the proposed code of conduct profile forms a
self-referential equilibrium.
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